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I. Introduction 
Consider the following not-uncommon scenario: High-level 
employees of a public corporation fraudulently misstate the 
corporation’s financials to make the company appear profitable and 
attractive to investors and lenders. The financial (mis)statements are 
certified by an outside auditor who failed to follow professional 
standards in performing the audit. Eventually, the fraud is uncovered 
and the true state of the company’s dismal financial situation is 
revealed. The corporation’s stock price plummets and it goes 
bankrupt. Creditors and shareholders of the company want to recover 
their losses from, inter alios, the auditor who negligently performed 
its audit. The failure, they allege, harmed them because the negligent 
audit allowed the fraud to continue longer than it would have if the 
auditor had met its duty under the engagement.1 The auditor in this 
scenario has a powerful defense in its corner: in pari delicto. 
Under accepted agency principles, the knowledge of a corporate 
officer is imputed to the corporation and the corporation is deemed 
to have that knowledge.2 Likewise, imputation makes the 
corporation legally responsible for an officer’s fraud.3 The officer’s 
fraud is, in law, the corporation’s fraud which makes the 
corporation a wrongdoer in front of the court.4 The defense of in 
                                                                                                     
 1. The auditor’s duty is not to uncover fraud; its duty is to perform in 
accordance with applicable professional standards and with the agreement between 
the parties. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health, Educ. & 
Research Found. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (AHERF), 989 A.2d 313, 332 (Pa. 
2010) (“[T]here are multiple levels of auditor review, and the specific responsibility 
of the auditor in any given undertaking generally will depend on the terms of the 
retention.”); NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 882 (N.J. 2006) (“KPMG 
had an independent contractual obligation, at a level defined by its agreement with 
PCN, to detect the fraud, which it allegedly failed to do.” (emphasis added)). 
 2. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 (2006) (“[N]otice of a fact that 
an agent knows or has reason to know is imputed to the principal if knowledge of 
the fact is material to the agent’s duties to the principal . . . .”). 
 3. See id. (stating that an agent’s knowledge of a fact is imputed to her 
principal “[f]or purposes of determining a principal’s legal relations with a third 
party”). 
 4. See Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 951 (N.Y. 2010) (“[A] 
corporation is represented by its officers and agents, and their fraud in the course of 
the corporate dealings is in law the fraud of the corporation.” (citations and 
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pari delicto5 prevents a wrongdoer from seeking redress against 
another alleged wrongdoer.6 Because the corporation’s creditors or 
shareholders bring their claim on behalf of the corporation, they “step 
into the shoes” of the corporation and any defense that can be asserted 
against the corporation may be asserted against them.7 In the 
corporate fraud context, then, these doctrines work together to 
immunize auditors from liability. 
This Note argues that auditors should not be immune from suit by 
or on behalf of a corporation imputed with its agent’s fraud. Strong 
policy reasons exist both for protecting auditors from these lawsuits 
and for leaving open the possibility of a lawsuit for auditor 
malpractice.8 One factor that weighs strongly against insulating 
auditors as a group is the way in which auditors have used the in pari 
delicto defense to achieve immunity. Before a court allows the 
defense—and stops a plaintiff from presenting its case no matter how 
strong—it must be satisfied that the plaintiff is a wrongdoer seeking to 
                                                                                                     
alterations omitted)). 
 5. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 
306 (1985) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY to define in pari delicto). The 
common law defense of in pari delicto comes from the Latin, in pari delicto 
potior est conditio defendentis: “In a case of equal or mutual fault . . . the 
position of the [defending] party . . . is the better one.” Id. 
 6. See id. at 307 (noting that the classic formulation of the defense was 
narrowly limited to situations where the plaintiff was at least equally 
responsible, but that many courts have given the defense broader application to 
bar actions by plaintiffs involved generally in the wrongdoing (citing Perma Life 
Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968))). 
 7. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006) (stating that a bankruptcy estate 
includes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the 
commencement of the case”); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. 
Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 356 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting in the bankruptcy 
setting that the “trustee stands in the shoes of the debtor and can only assert 
those causes of action possessed by the debtor”); Wight v. BankAmerica Corp., 
219 F.3d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that because management’s misconduct 
is imputed to the corporation and a trustee stands in the shoes of the 
corporation, the trustee is barred from bringing suit that he himself essentially 
took part in); Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 959 (holding that the doctrine of in pari 
delicto will bar a derivative claim under New York law where a corporation sues 
its outside auditor for professional malpractice or negligence in failing to detect 
fraud committed by the corporation). But see F.D.I.C. v. O’Melveny & Myers, 61 
F.3d 17, 19 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that defenses based on unclean hands or 
inequitable conduct do not generally apply against a party’s receiver because the 
receiver does not step into the parties shoes but “is thrust into those shoes”). 
 8. See infra Part III.C (presenting competing policy rationales for and 
against auditor liability). 
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recover for harm caused by its own misconduct.9 Courts should 
reconsider whether a corporation imputed with its agent’s fraud 
satisfies this element of the in pari delicto defense.10  
Imputation is not fault-based, and in pari delicto requires a 
showing of fault.11 A better approach would attempt to establish if the 
corporation itself can fairly be deemed to be at fault for failing to 
detect the agent’s fraud.12 This could be achieved by judging a 
corporation based on the adequacy of its information gathering and 
reporting systems.13 The systems implemented by the board of 
directors and carried out by corporate employees to deter and detect 
fraud would seem to offer a better measure of a corporation’s fault 
and would provide a more sound basis for an auditor’s use of the in 
pari delicto defense.14  
Part II of this Note provides background information on 
(1) imputation, including the adverse interest exception; (2) the in 
pari delicto doctrine; and (3) case law addressing imputation and in 
pari delicto in corporate fraud cases. Part III suggests why—
notwithstanding case law directly on point—this issue presents a 
                                                                                                     
 9. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 306 (noting that “[i]n a case of 
equal or mutual fault . . . the position of the [defending] party . . . is the better 
one” (emphasis added)); Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 950 (N.Y. 
2010) (defining in pari delicto as a mandate that “courts will not intercede to 
resolve a dispute between two wrongdoers”). 
 10. See Art Metal Works v. Abraham & Straus, 70 F.2d 641, 646 (2d Cir. 
1934) (Hand, J., dissenting), adopted as opinion of the court on r’hrg, 107 F.2d 
944, 944 (2d Cir. 1934) (“Whenever the question has come up, it has been held 
that immoral conduct to be relevant, must touch and taint the plaintiff 
personally; that the acts of his agents, though imputed to him legally, do not 
impugn his conscience vicariously.”); see also Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 
754 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he defense of in pari delicto loses its sting when the 
person who is in pari delicto is eliminated.”); infra Part IV (arguing that 
imputation is not relevant to the determination of a plaintiff’s wrongdoing as it 
relates to the defense of in pari delicto). 
 11. See Deborah A. DeMott, When Is a Principal Charged with an Agent’s 
Knowledge?, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 319 (2003) (“Basic agency 
doctrines are not fault-based . . . .”). 
 12. See infra Part IV.A (arguing that in pari delicto should only be 
available in those cases where the corporation bears actual fault). 
 13. The author thanks Washington and Lee School of Law Professor David 
Millon for suggesting consideration of a corporation’s information gathering and 
reporting systems as an effective measure for corporate action. 
 14. See infra Part IV.B (suggesting that a corporation’s information 
gathering and reporting systems provide the best measure of the corporation’s 
fault in failing to detect fraud). 
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problem and provides an opportunity to do better in future 
controversies. Part IV suggests an approach that rejects the use of 
imputation to satisfy the elements of the in pari delicto defense and 
argues instead for a plaintiff corporation to be judged based on the 
adequacy of its corporate systems. 
II. Background 
A. Imputation 
A discussion of imputation and the adverse interest exception 
is a necessary starting point to understanding the approach courts 
have traditionally taken to analyzing auditor liability in corporate 
fraud cases. When an agency relationship exists,15 the rule of 
imputation instructs that a principal is deemed to know facts that 
are known by its agent.16 The main purpose advanced to justify the 
fiction of imputation17 is proper risk allocation.18 As between a 
principal and a third party, the principal is in a better position to 
bear the risk that his agent will act in a way that is not 
sanctioned by him or will not convey knowledge the agent 
receives on his behalf.19 The principal is better able to bear this 
                                                                                                     
 15. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) (“Agency is the 
fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests 
assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s 
behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or 
otherwise consents so to act.”). 
 16. See id. § 5.03 (“[N]otice of a fact that an agent knows or has reason to 
know is imputed to the principal if knowledge of the fact is material to the 
agent’s duties to the principal . . . .”). 
 17. See DeMott, supra note 11, at 292 (“Imputing one person’s knowledge to 
another could be characterized as a quintessential legal fiction.”). 
 18. See, e.g., AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 335 (Pa. 2010) (tagging the underlying 
purpose of imputation to be “fair risk allocation, including the affordance of 
appropriate protection to those who transact business with corporations”). 
 19. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (2006) 
(“Imputation thus reduces the risk that a principal may deploy agents as a 
shield against the legal consequences of facts the principal would prefer not to 
know.”); Martin R. Scordato, Evidentiary Surrogacy and Risk Allocation: 
Understanding Imputed Knowledge and Notice in Modern Agency Law, 10 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 129, 155 (2004) (“[F]rom a risk allocation 
perspective, the possibility of an adverse agent failing to transmit successfully 
to the principal important knowledge or notice is a problem far better managed 
by the principal than by the third party.”). 
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risk because of the internal relationship between principal and 
agent.20 The principal selects, monitors, and controls his agents.21 
And imputation destroys a principal’s incentive to deploy agents as a 
filter to receiving “bad” information.22 By holding the principal legally 
responsible for his agent’s knowledge, the principal has strong 
incentive to receive that knowledge.23 
1. Adverse Interest Exception 
In some cases, the justification for imputation is outweighed 
by other considerations. Imputation does not apply when “the 
agent acts adversely to the principal in a transaction or matter, 
intending to act solely for the agent’s own purposes or those of 
another person.”24 This exception addresses the reality that when 
an agent has abandoned his principal’s interest, the presumption 
that he will fulfill his duty to relay information to his principal 
fails. While it is clear that the presumption fails, it is less clear 
                                                                                                     
 20. See DeMott, supra note 11, at 315 (suggesting treatment of imputation 
“as a recognition of the fact that, when an agent interacts with third parties on 
behalf of a principal, the internal relationship between principal and agent 
shapes many dimensions of the agent’s interaction with the third party”); see 
also id. at 317 (“Imputation may also be justified on the basis of its impact on 
behavior.”). 
 21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 illus. 8 (2006) (“Imputation 
creates strong incentives for principals to design and implement effective 
systems through which agents handle and report information.”). 
 22. See DeMott, supra note 11, at 315–16 (“Imputation responds to the 
evident temptation for agents to be reticent in sharing ‘bad facts’ with their 
principals.”). Imputation reduces the temptation of those in control of an 
organization to create a structure which isolates “bad facts” in the hands of few 
agents. See id. at 317–18 (noting that without imputation such a structure 
would deflect the organization’s accountability to those with whom its agent 
dealt). 
 23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (2006) (“By charging a 
principal with notice of material facts that an agent knows or has reason to 
know, imputation reduces incentives to deal through agents as a way to avoid 
the legal consequences of facts that a principal might prefer not to know.”); see 
also DeMott, supra note 11, at 317 (“[F]rom a principal’s standpoint, it is 
preferable that an agent transmit ‘bad facts’ so that the principal may 
determine how to react as opposed to proceeding with a transaction in the 
absence of actual knowledge.”). 
 24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 (2006). 
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why it matters.25 In other contexts, when the presumption is 
proven false, it is still maintained.26 Addressing this conflict, the 
Restatement (Third) of Agency sets out an exception to the 
exception. Notice will be imputed when an agent acts adversely to 
her principal “when necessary to protect the rights of a third 
party who dealt with the principal in good faith.”27 
The third-party-protection exception to the adverse interest 
exception demonstrates agency law’s goal of protecting good-faith 
third parties.28 It also shows an attempt to modulate the “unduly 
severe” results that arise from agency law’s “all-or-nothing” 
basis.29 Courts have adopted further exceptions to avoid strict 
                                                                                                     
 25. See Scordato, supra note 19, at 155 (“[T]he existence of the adverse 
agent exception to the imputed knowledge rule is not supported by the risk 
allocation rationale.”); see also Goldstein v. Union Nat’l Bank, 213 S.W. 584, 
590–91 (Tex. 1919) (offering an “incompatibility test” for the adverse interest 
exception met when “the agent’s interests are so incompatible with the interests 
of his principal . . . to render it reasonably probable that an ordinary person . . . 
will [not] act in behalf of his principal” (emphasis added)); McRaith v. BDO 
Seidman, LLP, 909 N.E.2d 310, 331 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (explaining that the 
exception “suspends the operation of the general rule when the circumstances 
are such as to raise a clear presumption that the agent will not perform [his] 
duty, and thus that the principal will not in fact receive and have the benefit of 
the agent’s knowledge”). But see In re CBI Holding Co., 311 B.R. 350, 369–70 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding the adverse interest exception to be “entirely consistent 
with the principles of agency law” because when the agent has totally 
abandoned the interests of his principal the fiction of imputation is untenable). 
 26. See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 11, at 315 (noting that “[i]t is not a defense 
to a principal that an agent breached the agent’s duty to transmit relevant 
information, even when the principal can establish that the agent withheld the 
information” (emphasis added)); see also Andrew J. Morris, Clarifying the 
Imputation Doctrine: Charging Audit Clients with Responsibility for 
Unauthorized Audit Interference, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 339, 350 (2001) 
(noting that imputation’s primary purpose is to protect innocent third parties). 
But see DeMott, supra note 11, at 316–17 (suggesting that imputation is 
justified because “the internal relationship between the principal and the agent 
shapes many dimensions of the agent’s interaction with the third party,” and 
when the agent’s actions place him “outside the control structures put in place 
by the principal,” the adverse interest exception makes sense). 
 27. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04(a) (2006). A second exception to 
the adverse interest exception calls for imputation “when the principal has 
ratified or knowingly retained a benefit from the agent’s action.” Id. § 5.04(b). 
 28. See Scordato, supra note 19, at 163 (noting that the extremely narrow 
version of the adverse interest exception set out in the Restatement (Third) of 
Agency is “as close to consistent with the risk allocation rationale as is possible 
while still retaining an adverse agent exception”). 
 29. DeMott, supra note 11, at 319. 
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application of the adverse interest exception when it would lead 
to an unjust result.30 These court-fashioned exceptions reveal 
that imputation and the adverse interest exception are the wrong 
tools for the job of addressing auditor liability.  
a. The Sole Actor and Innocent Decision-Maker Exceptions 
The two court-fashioned exceptions to the adverse interest 
exception used in corporate fraud cases are the sole actor 
exception and the innocent decision-maker exception. The sole 
actor exception was created to defeat the adverse interest 
exception when the agent is the sole representative of the 
principal.31 It provides that “if an agent is the sole representative 
of a principal, then that agent’s fraudulent conduct is imputable 
to the principal regardless of whether the agent’s conduct was 
adverse to the principal’s interests.”32 Courts reason that if the 
corporation and the agent are one and the same, the agent has no 
one to whom the agent can communicate knowledge, and the 
adverse interest exception should not block imputation.33 
The innocent decision-maker exception carves back the sole 
actor exception and prevents imputation when the corporation 
has innocent decision-makers who could have stopped the fraud 
                                                                                                     
 30. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 
267 F.3d 340, 359 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding that the court need not address the 
adverse interest exception “because the ‘adverse interest exception’ is itself 
subject to an exception—the ‘sole actor’ exception”); In re CBI Holding Co., 311 
B.R. 350, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (defining the innocent insider, or innocent 
decision-maker, exception). 
 31. See In re Jack Greenberg, Inc., 212 B.R. 76, 86 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (“Where 
the officer in question is the sole representative of the corporation, there is no 
one to whom to impart his or her knowledge and no one from whom to conceal 
it.”). 
 32. Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 359; see also In re Norvergence, Inc., 405 B.R. 709, 
748 (D.N.J. 2009) (describing the sole actor exception to the adverse interest 
exception). 
 33. See Thabault v. Chait, 541 F.3d 512, 528–29 (3d Cir. 2008) (recognizing 
the sole actor exception but refusing to apply it when the plaintiffs owned only 
65% of the corporation’s stock); In re CBI Holding Co., 311 B.R. at 373 (“[I]t 
would be nonsensical to refrain from imputing the agent’s acts of fraud to the 
corporation, despite the agent’s total abandonment of the corporation’s interests, 
[when] the agent is identical to the corporation.”). 
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had they discovered it.34 The rationale behind this exception is 
that 
where only some members of management are guilty of the 
misconduct, and the innocent members could and would have 
prevented the misconduct had they known of it, the culpability 
of the malefactors should not be imputed to the company 
because that imputation would punish innocent insiders (e.g., 
non-culpable shareholders) unfairly.35 
These court-fashioned exceptions are not universally recognized 
but have become part of the arsenal advocates use when arguing 
for or against imputation.36 
b. Tests for the Adverse Interest Exception Vary by State 
State law governs the common law of agency.37 States have 
widely accepted the adverse interest exception but articulate the 
test for adverse action differently.38 New York, for example, has 
adopted a very narrow construction.39 In New York, an agent 
must “have totally abandoned his principal’s interests and be 
                                                                                                     
 34. See In re CBI Holding Co., 311 B.R. at 372 (defining the innocent 
insider, or innocent decision-maker, exception); see also In re Am. Int’l Grp., 
Inc., Consol. Derivative Litig. (AIG II), 976 A.2d 872, 893 n.56 (Del. Ch. 2009) 
(noting that in New York “there never actually was a freestanding innocent 
insider exception, it was simply an exception to the so-called ‘sole actor rule’ 
which is itself an exception to the adverse interest exception”). 
 35. In re CBI Holding Co., 311 B.R. at 372. 
 36. See, e.g., Amelia Toy Rudolph, Invoking In Pari Delicto to Bar 
Accountant Liability Actions Brought by Trustees and Receivers, SS009 ALI-
ABA 547, 574 & 579 (2010) (noting that the sole actor exception has been widely 
accepted but that more courts reject than accept the innocent decision-maker 
exception). 
 37. See, e.g., O’Melveny & Myers v. F.D.I.C., 512 U.S. 79, 84–85 (1994) 
(holding that in the FDIC receivership context “[state] law, not federal law, 
governs the imputation of knowledge to corporate victims of alleged 
negligence”). 
 38. See Rudolph, supra note 36, at 574–75 (citing fifty-four state and 
federal cases applying the exception). 
 39. See, e.g., In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. (AIG I), 965 A.2d 763, 824 (Del. Ch. 
2009) (noting that the adverse interest exception under New York law is “an 
extremely narrow one”); see also id. at 825 (declining to adopt the innocent 
insider exception in applying New York law because “the recent trend of New 
York law has been strongly against [its] adoption”). 
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acting entirely for his own or another’s purposes.”40 The New 
York Court of Appeals takes the position that “[s]o long as the 
corporate wrongdoer’s fraudulent conduct enables the business to 
survive—to attract investors and customers and raise funds for 
corporate purposes—this test is not met.”41 By contrast, 
Pennsylvania takes a less-restrictive approach and articulates its 
test this way: 
Where an agent acts in his own interest which is antagonistic 
to that of his principal, or commits a fraud for his own benefit 
in a matter which is beyond the scope of his actual or apparent 
authority or employment, the principal who has received no 
benefit therefrom will not be liable for the agent’s tortious 
act.42 
While Pennsylvania’s test is similar, Pennsylvania courts use a 
different measure to determine whether a “benefit” has been 
received by the principal.43 
What distinguishes the tests for the adverse interest 
exception is the “degree of self-interest required, or, conversely, 
the quantum of benefit to the corporation necessary to avoid the 
exception’s application (where self-interest is evident).”44 In 
allowing any short-term benefit to defeat the exception, New York 
has created a clear rule where virtually all corporate fraud will be 
                                                                                                     
 40. Center v. Hampton Affiliates, Inc., 488 N.E.2d 828, 900 (N.Y. 1985) 
(emphasis added); see also Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 952 (N.Y. 
2010) (noting that New York’s narrow scope for the adverse interest exception 
defeats the presumption of communication when the corporation is “actually the 
victim of a scheme undertaken by the agent to benefit himself” and is consistent 
with fundamental principles of agency law). 
 41. Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 953 (citing Baena v. KPMG LLP, 453 F.3d 1, 7 
(1st Cir. 2006)). 
 42. Todd v. Skelly, 120 A.2d 906, 909 (Pa. 1956); see also AHERF, 989 A.2d 
313, 336 (Pa. 2010) (citing Todd to provide Pennsylvania’s “traditional, liberal 
test for corporate benefit”). 
 43. AHERF, 989 A.2d at 334 (“[W]e believe there is . . . difficulty with 
applying too liberal a litmus for benefit, particularly in a paradigm involving 
alleged collusion between the agent and the defendant.”). 
 44. Id.; see also Rudolph, supra note 36, at 564 (noting that courts 
articulate the test for the adverse interest exception in various ways “with the 
variations generally appearing to be the extent of the agent’s personal benefit or 
motivation and the extent of the adversity to the corporation”). Rudolph further 
notes that “the battleground is often whether the benefit from the alleged 
wrongdoing must be exclusively for the agent (e.g., embezzlement) for 
the . . . exception to apply.” Id. 
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imputed to the corporation.45 Other states have taken a harder 
look at what constitutes a benefit and have refused to find one 
where the corporation’s existence is “artificially prolonged” 
through its officers’ fraud.46  
The adverse interest exception has the difficult charge of 
avoiding the harsh result of imputation while not creating an 
equally unjust outcome through its application. When a 
corporation is tainted with fraud, imputation is essential to 
protecting innocent third parties who were harmed by their 
dealings with the corporation.47 The adverse interest exception, 
then, should not apply in most instances of corporate fraud.48  
Because imputation is essential to protecting those who 
transact business with corporations, reliance on the adverse 
interest exception by those attempting to defeat the in pari 
delicto defense is misplaced. The exception’s failure in this 
context is evidenced by (1) the court-fashioned exceptions to the 
adverse interest exception—created to address the ever-present 
case where strictly applying the adverse interest exception would 
produce undesirable results49—and (2) by the differing standards 
                                                                                                     
 45. Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 952 (noting that the exception is reserved for 
cases of “outright theft or looting or embezzlement”). 
 46. See Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1348 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding that 
“prolonged artificial insolvency” is a “Pyrrhic benefit” which should not block the 
adverse interest exception); In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 365 B.R. 24, 56 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“This Court is not of a mind to hold at this point in time, on 
motion, that even a peppercorn of benefit to a corporation from the wrongful 
conduct would provide total dispensation to defendants knowingly and 
substantially assisting insider misconduct that is overwhelmingly adverse to the 
corporation.”). The Seventh Circuit’s position in Schacht has been termed the 
“deepening insolvency” rationale for finding an adverse interest. See, e.g., 
Matthew G. Dore, Presumed Innocent? Financial Institutions, Professional 
Malpractice Claims, and Defenses Based on Management Misconduct, 1995 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 127, 156 (1995) (discussing the deepening insolvency 
rationale). 
 47. See, e.g., Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 954 (N.Y. 2010) 
(“No one disputes that traditional imputation principles, including a narrowly 
confined adverse interest exception, should remain unchanged—indeed, are 
essential—in other contexts.”). 
 48. See id. (refusing to apply the adverse interest exception); see also 
AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 333 (Pa. 2010) (noting that it would be a mistake to 
apply the adverse interest exception too broadly in part because 
“[i]mputation . . . serves to protect those who transact business with a 
corporation through its agents”). 
 49. See, e.g., AIG II, 976 A.2d 872, 884 (Del. Ch. 2009) (noting the “squishy 
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of corporate benefit and self-interest that courts have created to 
determine if the exception applies.50 
The adverse interest exception addresses a narrow set of 
circumstances in which an agent’s acts are so contrary to her 
proper role in the agency relationship that it would be manifestly 
unfair to hold the principal responsible for them.51 In the case of 
corporate fraud, the fraudulent acts are contrary to the agent’s 
duty to perform according to the law.52 But they are not so far 
removed from the agent’s role in the agency relationship that it 
would be unfair to hold the corporation responsible to third 
parties injured by their dealings with the agent.53 The facts 
relevant to determining if the adverse interest exception should 
apply address the suitability of holding a principal legally 
responsible for its agent’s dealings with third parties. These facts 
do not inform whether a corporation should be permitted to 
recover from its auditor for malpractice. This divergence has 
historically been addressed through exceptions to a rule that does 
not reach the underlying issue.54 A better approach would 
directly address whether the corporation should be able to 
recover from its auditor for malpractice.55 
                                                                                                     
manner in which some courts have employed the in pari delicto doctrine” and 
chiding the plaintiffs for asking the court to “find that th[e] case falls within 
some ‘exception’ to the traditional application of the doctrine”); see also supra 
Part II.A.1 (discussing the adverse interest exception, the sole actor exception, 
and the innocent decision-maker exception). 
 50. See supra Part II.A.1.b (discussing the benefit and self-interest analysis 
employed to determine applicability of the adverse interest exception). 
 51. See, e.g., In re CBI Holding Co., Inc., 311 B.R. 350, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(noting that “agency would fall into desuetude if imputation had no bounds”). 
 52. See AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 827 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“[A]ny conscious act of a 
fiduciary causing a corporation to break the law is against the corporation’s 
charter and best interests.”). 
 53. See, e.g., Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 951 (N.Y. 2010) 
(discussing the importance of holding corporations responsible for the acts of 
their agents and noting that “[a]gency law presumes imputation even where the 
agent acts less than admirably, exhibits poor business judgment, or commits 
fraud”). 
 54. See, e.g., id. at 954 (noting that the plaintiffs request that the adverse 
interest exception be altered for purposes of the in pari delicto defense only 
because a narrowly confined adverse interest exception is essential in other 
contexts). 
 55. See infra Part IV (arguing that the availability of the in pari delicto 
defense should not turn on imputation but that it should be available only if the 
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2. Third Parties Not Acting in Good Faith 
In addition to using the adverse interest exception, courts 
have defeated the in pari delicto defense by finding that when an 
auditor is charged with fraud, agency law does not support 
imputation.56 There are two main reasons that an auditor should 
not be permitted to invoke imputation when the third party does 
not deal with the principal in good faith. First, when a third party 
colludes with an agent who acts adversely to his principal, the 
law does not maintain the presumption that the agent will 
communicate his knowledge to the principal.57 This is the adverse 
interest exception to imputation discussed previously.58 But 
consider this scenario: an agent secretly colludes with a third 
party to perform an act that is not deemed “adverse” to his 
organizational principal. For example, when an officer secretly 
misstates the financials of a corporation, this fraud may be 
considered a benefit to the corporation rather than an adverse 
act.59 The adverse interest exception will not apply, but its 
rationale operates with equal force to vitiate the presumption 
that the agent will communicate with his principal.60 When the 
agent and the third party are colluding in a way that is kept 
secret from the principal—even though the act is not considered 
“adverse” under applicable state law—the third party is certain 
                                                                                                     
corporation can meaningfully be deemed a wrongdoer). 
 56. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 cmt. b (2006) (“If the 
third party colludes with the agent against the principal or otherwise knows or 
has reason to know that the agent is acting adversely to the principal, the third 
party should not expect that the agent will fulfill duties of disclosure owed to the 
principal.”). 
 57. See id. § 5.03 cmt. b (noting that notwithstanding the adverse interest 
exception to imputation, an agent’s knowledge is imputed “when necessary to 
protect the rights of a third party who dealt with the principal in good faith”) 
(emphasis added). 
 58. See supra Part II.A.1 for more detail on the adverse interest exception. 
 59. See, e.g., Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 953 (N.Y. 2010) (“So 
long as the corporate wrongdoer’s fraudulent conduct enables the business to 
survive—to attract investors and customers and raise funds for corporate 
purposes—this test [for adverse action rather than corporate benefit] is not 
met.”). 
 60. But see supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing the divergence 
of the adverse interest expectation from the rationale for imputation). 
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the agent will not communicate the knowledge to the principal 
and the fiction of imputation should not be maintained.61 
Second, for an agency relationship to exist the agent must 
have authority to bind the principal.62 This comes in the form of 
actual authority or apparent authority.63 An agent has actual 
authority when the principal has expressly given the agent 
authority to act on its behalf, or when the agent reasonably 
believes that he has authority to act on its behalf.64 Apparent 
authority exists when a third party reasonably believes the agent 
has the authority to act on behalf of the principal.65  
An agent who colludes with a third party to secretly commit 
fraud—even for the benefit of his principal—acts with neither 
actual nor apparent authority.66 The agent himself does not 
believe that “the principal wishes [him] so to act.”67 This is 
evidenced by the secretive nature of his actions.68 Similarly, no 
apparent authority exists because the collusive third party knows 
                                                                                                     
 61. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 cmt. b (2006) (“[I]mputation 
protects innocent third parties but not those who know or have reason to know 
that an agent is not likely to transmit material information to the principal.”). 
 62. See id. intro. note (“[T]he three distinct bases on which the common law 
of agency attributes the legal consequences of one person’s action to another 
person . . . are actual authority, apparent authority, and respondeat superior.”). 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. § 2.01 (“An agent acts with actual authority when, at the time of 
taking action that has legal consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably 
believes, in accordance with the principal’s manifestations to the agent, that the 
principal wishes the agent so to act.”); see also id. cmt b (defining express actual 
authority and implied actual authority). 
 65. See id. § 2.03 (“Apparent authority is the power held by an agent or 
other actor to affect a principal’s legal relations with third parties when a third 
party reasonably believes the actor has authority to act on behalf of the 
principal and that belief is traceable to the principal’s manifestations.”). 
 66. See, e.g., AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 336 (Pa. 2010) (noting that, when an 
agent and third party collude, “the agent’s authority is neither actual nor 
apparent” because “both the agent and the third party know very well that the 
agent’s conduct goes unsanctioned by one or more of the tiers of corporate 
governance”); cf. Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining 
Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 650 (2010) (“For a 
corporate director knowingly to cause the corporation to engage in unlawful acts 
or activities or enter an unlawful business is disloyal in the most fundamental of 
senses.”). 
 67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (2006). 
 68. See, e.g., AHERF, 989 A.2d at 337 (“Imputation is not justified in 
scenarios involving secretive, collusive activity . . . .”). 
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that the secretive actions are not authorized.69 Imputation, which 
only applies to an agency relationship, is not applicable when one 
of “the three distinct bases on which the common law of agency 
attributes the legal consequences of one person’s action to 
another person” is not present.70 
Understanding when imputation and the adverse exception 
apply is essential to examining how courts have traditionally 
approached auditor liability in corporate fraud cases.71 These 
principles may also be important to other defenses an auditor can 
raise such as inability to prove causation in a fraud claim.72 The 
role that imputation may play in other contexts, and the 
desirability of precluding auditors as a class from invoking 
imputation, however, are beyond the scope of this Note.73 Here, 
                                                                                                     
 69. Id. 
 70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY intro. note (2006). 
 71. See, e.g., AHERF, 989 A.2d at 333 (noting that “agency law plays a 
pivotal role in the [in pari delicto] defense’s practical availability” because 
attribution of the officers’ misconduct to the corporation is a linchpin to the 
defendant auditor’s ability to raise the defense). 
 72. See Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1346 n.2 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting 
that a defendant can use imputation for a claim of estoppel or the inability to 
prove causation in a fraud claim). For example, in Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & 
Seidman, discussed infra Part II.C.1, the plaintiffs brought claims against the 
corporation’s auditor for breach of contract, professional malpractice, and fraud. 
The court analyzed the three claims as a “single form of wrongdoing under 
different names.” Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 453 (7th Cir. 
1982). The court noted that “a participant in a fraud cannot also be a victim 
entitled to recover damages, for he cannot have relied on the truth of the 
fraudulent representations, and such reliance is an essential element in a case 
of fraud.” Id. at 454. This approach is arguably incorrect. See AIG I, 965 A.2d 
763, 826 (Del. Ch. 2009) (criticizing Cenco for “blithely” taking the same position 
as to claims for negligent conduct and intentional conduct and for finding that 
all claims were governed by one defense). The approach to each claim should be 
distinct: An auditor (1) may not invoke imputation when charged with fraud but 
may seek to prove that the corporation itself was at fault and invoke the in pari 
delicto defense, and (2) may impute a fraudulent agent’s knowledge to the 
corporation when faced with a claim of breach of contract or negligence but 
imputation would not necessarily be relevant to the auditor’s defense against 
these claims. See infra Part IV (arguing that a plaintiff corporation’s actions 
should be judged by the acts of the corporation, not simply by imputing the 
wrongdoing of one agent to the corporation). 
 73. But see infra Part II.C.5.b for a brief discussion of Chancellor Strine’s 
argument that auditors should be treated like corporate insiders and precluded 
from invoking imputation when the corporation brings suit against them for 
their wrongdoing. 
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the focus rests on considering how courts’ traditional approach to 
auditor malpractice—combining imputation with the in pari 
delicto defense to bar suit—may be flawed. 
B. In Pari Delicto 
1. Defined 
In pari delicto is an affirmative defense74 which provides that 
when a plaintiff and defendant stand in a position of equal or 
mutual fault, the position of the defendant is the better one.75 
The defense is the “counterpart legal doctrine to [the equitable 
defense] of unclean hands.”76 Some courts have used the legal and 
equitable doctrines “interchangeably without discussion of any 
difference between them,”77 while others have drawn a distinction 
between the defense brought at law and in equity.78 Beyond the 
                                                                                                     
 74. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 
267 F.3d 340, 354 (3d Cir. 2001) (classifying in pari delicto as an affirmative 
defense). The Second Circuit characterizes in pari delicto as a matter of 
standing. See, e.g., Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 
120 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that the bankruptcy trustee lacked standing because 
a “claim against a third party for defrauding a corporation with the cooperation 
of management accrues to creditors, not to the guilty corporation”); see also 
Wight v. BankAmerica Corp., 219 F.3d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that in the 
corporate fraud context where the “trustee stands in the shoes of the 
corporation, the Wagoner rule bars a trustee from suing to recover for a wrong 
that he himself essentially took part in”). This outlier position, known as the 
Wagoner Rule, does not change the analysis here and will not be mentioned 
further in this Note.  
 75. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 
306 (1985) (“In a case of equal or mutual fault . . . the position of the [defending] 
party . . . is the better one.”). 
 76. Byron v. Clay, 867 F.2d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 77. See, e.g., T. Leigh Anenson, Treating Equity Like Law: A Post-Merger 
Justification of Unclean Hands, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 455, 482–83 (2008) (citing New 
York and Maryland cases); see also id. at 468–74 (surveying the different uses of 
the doctrines among states and in federal courts and arguing for the death of 
the distinction between the legal and equitable defenses). 
 78. See AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 328 n.16 (Pa. 2010) (noting that a previous 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision which applied the unclean hands doctrine 
to a case brought in equity could not “fully answer the question of how in pari 
delicto should function with regard to claims substantively grounded at law”). 
But see id. at 328 (recognizing that in pari delicto has “surmounted its moorings 
in strict equity jurisprudence and transitioned into a defense in actions at law” 
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law–equity distinction, the defense is complicated by different 
standards under federal law and state law—where the standards 
further diverge by state.79  
From this background, however, the doctrine can be 
presented in three general principles. First, the plaintiff’s 
responsibility must be substantially equal to or greater than the 
defendant’s.80 Second, the illegal activity that the plaintiff 
engaged in must be the subject of the lawsuit.81 And third, even 
where these conditions are present, public policy considerations 
can defeat the defense.82 Unavoidable, then, is the recognition 
that the defense is “judicial implementation of social policy.”83 
                                                                                                     
in many jurisdictions including Pennsylvania). 
 79. See, e.g., Rudolph, supra note 36, at 574–77 (presenting different 
articulations of the standard under federal law and state law). 
 80. See, e.g., AHERF, 989 A.2d at 329 n.19 (noting that for the defense to 
apply in Pennsylvania the parties must either have relatively equal degrees of 
fault or the plaintiff’s fault must be clearly greater). But see Bateman, 472 U.S. 
at 307 (noting that “many courts have given the in pari delicto defense a broad 
application to bar actions where plaintiffs simply have been involved generally 
in the same sort of wrong-doing as defendants” (citations omitted)); AIG II, 976 
A.2d 872, 883–84 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“Although the literal translation of in pari 
delicto is ‘in equal fault,’ the doctrine does not require that a court engage in the 
type of accounting that in pari delicto is meant to avoid . . . .”). 
 81. See, e.g., McAdam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 896 F.2d 750, 757 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (“[I]n order to bar recovery, the plaintiff must be an active, voluntary 
participant in the unlawful activity that is the subject of the suit.”). 
 82. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 
307 (1985) (“In addition, the public policy considerations that undergirded the in 
pari delicto defense were frequently construed as precluding the defense even 
where the plaintiff bore substantial fault for his injury.” (citations omitted)); 
AHERF, 989 A.2d at 330 (“[T]he roots of the defense in equity 
jurisprudence . . . undermines [defendant’s] contention that in pari delicto is to 
be woodenly applied . . . .”); cf. Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1349 (7th Cir. 
1983) (reaching its conclusion in part because “permitting recovery in this case 
would not send unqualified signals to shareholders that they need not be alert to 
managerial fraud since they may later recover full indemnification for that 
fraud” (emphasis added)); id. at 1349 n.5 (referring to the outcome in Cenco as 
“the deterrence policy of Cenco”); NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 
881 (N.J. 2006) (“[An] auditor should not be able to avoid responsibility for its 
own misdeeds because imputation ‘is invocable to protect the innocent, never to 
promote an injustice.’” (quoting Nischne v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 173 A. 
341, 342 (N.J. Ch. 1934))). 
 83. AHERF, 989 A.2d at 331. 
CORPORATE WRONGDOING 293 
Judicial discretion, though, is consistent with in pari delicto’s 
roots in equity.84 Courts should not apply the defense “woodenly” 
when other considerations trump the policy basis for the doctrine 
itself.85 And it follows that the doctrine should not be used in a 
way that does not promote the policy considerations for which it 
was created. In pari delicto is intended to prevent a wrongdoer 
from profiting from his own misconduct.86 The plaintiff must be a 
wrongdoer to achieve the “important public policy purposes” that 
have placed the doctrine “in the inmost texture of our common 
law for at least two centuries.”87 Courts should reconsider if 
imputation carries the burden of making the corporation a 
wrongdoer. In fact, persuasive case law cautions against 
combining imputation with in pari delicto to bar a claim.88 
2. In Pari Delicto Applied in Conjunction with Imputation 
In applying in pari delicto, recent cases have glossed over the 
doctrine as well-settled law that does not require close 
examination.89 But the application of in pari delicto in 
                                                                                                     
 84. See, e.g., Anenson, supra note 77, at 482 (noting that “the doctrine of in 
pari delicto serves such diverse purposes as preserving the dignity of the courts, 
expressing a moral principle, and enforcing public policy”); see also id. (noting 
that in pari delicto was first applied by Lord Mansfield who was overheard 
commenting that he “never liked law so much as when it resembled equity” 
(citations omitted)). But see Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-Aero, Inc., 741 F.2d 925, 
939 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., concurring) (“The time when equity relief really 
was discretionary—a judgment committed to the conscience of the chancellor—
is past, the law of equity having long ago crystallized in a system of rules 
similar in basic character to the rules of the common law, though perhaps 
marginally more flexible.”). 
 85. AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 330 (Pa. 2010). 
 86. See, e.g., Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 950 (N.Y. 2010) 
(“[T]he principle that a wrongdoer should not profit from his own misconduct is 
so strong in New York that we have said the defense applies even in difficult 
cases . . . .”). 
 87. Id. (noting that in pari delicto serves the purposes of denying judicial 
relief to an admitted wrongdoer and avoiding entangling courts in disputes 
between wrongdoers). 
 88. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 10 (citing opinions by Judge Learned 
Hand and Judge Richard Posner that decline to apply in pari delicto). 
 89. See, e.g., AHERF, 989 A.2d at 328 (“The Latin derivation and equitable 
origins of the underlying common-law maxim [of in pari delicto] have been well 
traveled and need not be revisited at length here.”); see also cases discussed 
294 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 275 (2012) 
conjunction with imputation against corporate plaintiffs is 
fundamentally different than its application against the actual 
wrongdoer.90 There is a leap in logic from holding a corporation 
legally responsible for the acts of its agent through imputation to 
classifying it as a wrongdoer who may not bring a claim before 
the court.91 
Consider the case of a plaintiff who is a natural person. If a 
defendant wishes to raise the defense of in pari delicto, he bears 
the burden of proving that the plaintiff bears substantially equal 
or greater responsibility for the underlying illegality.92 When that 
plaintiff is a principal in an agency relationship, the acts of an 
agent will not satisfy this requirement. This is because, as Judge 
Learned Hand declared, “immoral conduct[,] to be relevant, must 
touch and taint the plaintiff personally; . . . the acts of his agents, 
though imputed to him legally, do not impugn his conscience 
vicariously.”93  
In other contexts, courts have set a high standard for a 
defendant to show that the plaintiff was at equal fault. For 
example, the Supreme Court, in a securities fraud case, held that 
a tippee, while guilty of fraud, is not culpable enough for a tipper 
broker-dealer to raise the in pari delicto defense.94 
                                                                                                     
infra Part II.C (discussing three recent influential cases which apply in pari 
delicto with little discussion of the defense). 
 90. See Universal Builders, Inc. v. Moon Motor Lodge, Inc., 244 A.2d 10, 13 
(Pa. 1968) (finding that a corporate plaintiff was not barred from bringing suit 
when its officer had committed a wrong because “attribution of one party’s 
unclean hands to another party is not based on simple agency principles”). 
 91. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 (2006) (“For purposes 
of determining a principal’s legal relations with a third party, notice of a fact 
that an agent knows or has reason to know is imputed to the principal . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
 92. See, e.g., AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 329 n.19 (Pa. 2010) (noting that some 
courts have dispensed with the strict requirement that the plaintiff bear equal 
or greater responsibility for the harm). 
 93. Art Metal Works v. Abraham & Straus, 70 F.2d 641, 646 (2d Cir. 1934) 
(Hand, J., dissenting), adopted as opinion of the court on r’hrg, 107 F.2d 944, 
944 (2d Cir. 1934). 
 94. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 314 
(1985) (“Absent other culpable actions by a tippee that can fairly be said to 
outweigh these violations by insiders and broker-dealers, we do not believe that 
the tippee properly can be characterized as being of substantially equal 
culpability as his tippers.”). 
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This issue is illuminated in the corporate fraud context 
where the plaintiff is a bankruptcy trustee95 or receiver.96 Here, 
the wrongdoer has been removed from the scene and the plaintiff 
before the court is an innocent party.97 In these cases, courts 
often deny use of the defense because it leads to an unjust 
result.98 Courts that allow the defense are more likely to do so 
against a bankruptcy trustee.99 This is because they feel bound by 
federal bankruptcy law100 to apply any defense that would have 
been available against the bankrupt party to the trustee.101  
                                                                                                     
 95. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 
267 F.3d 340, 358 (3d Cir. 2001) (joining the Second, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits 
in applying in pari delicto to bar claims of a bankruptcy trustee without regard 
to the trustee’s status as an innocent successor). 
 96. See F.D.I.C. v. O’Melveny & Myers, 61 F.3d 17, 19 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(noting that “defenses based on a party’s unclean hands or inequitable conduct 
do not generally apply against that party’s receiver”). The Ninth Circuit would 
also deny in pari delicto against a bankruptcy trustee. See id. (noting that a 
bankruptcy trustee is one category of receiver against whom in pari delicto 
would not apply); see also Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 358 (distinguishing prior cases 
that declined to apply in pari delicto in the receivership context from the 
present case, which involved a bankruptcy trustee, because “unlike bankruptcy 
trustees, receivers are not subject of the limits of section 541”). 
 97. See, e.g., Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The 
appointment of the receiver removed the wrongdoer from the scene. The 
corporations were no more Douglas’s evil zombies. Freed from his spell they 
became entitled to the return of the moneys—for the benefit not of Douglas but 
of innocent investors . . . .”). 
 98. See, e.g., McRaith v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 909 N.E.2d 310, 336 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2009) (finding defendant’s attempt to equate the liquidator of an insolvent 
insurance company with the company’s wrongdoing officer to be “illogical and 
unavailing” because “the Liquidator, by statutory definition, is not the 
wrongdoer”). 
 99. See Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 358 (noting that “[w]hile bankruptcy law 
mandates that the trustee step into the shoes of the debtor when asserting 
causes of action, state law generally provides the substantive law governing 
imputation for state law claims”). 
 100. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006) (stating that a bankruptcy estate includes 
“all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the 
commencement of the case”). 
 101. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 
F.3d 340, 357 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The plain language of section 541, however, 
prevents courts from taking into account events that occur after the 
commencement of the bankruptcy case. As a result, we must evaluate the in 
pari delicto defense without regard to whether the Committee is an innocent 
successor.”); see also In re the Pers. and Bus. Ins. Agency, 334 F.3d 239, 246 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (finding that because “[t]here is no limiting language in § 548 similar 
to that in § 541,” there is no reason not to follow the “better rule” not to impute 
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But in pari delicto should not, in the first instance, be an 
available defense against a corporation based solely on the 
corporation being imputed with the wrongful acts of its agents.102 
Whether federal or state law applies, a corporation’s legal 
responsibility for the acts of its agents is not identical to the label 
of “wrongdoer” which would invite the in pari delicto defense.103 
C. Case Law 
1. Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman 
Several courts have recently considered how to address 
auditor liability in corporate fraud cases using the principles of 
imputation and in pari delicto. Before turning to recent cases, it 
will be informative to first consider the case that provides the 
foundation for auditor liability in corporate fraud cases. The 
Seventh Circuit case Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman104 led to a 
“pioneering decision” in the area of corporate auditor liability.105 
                                                                                                     
the agent’s conduct when it would lead to an inequitable result). But see In re 
Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 365 B.R. 24, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (criticizing Lafferty’s 
analysis of § 541 and suggesting that § 541 is only relevant to ownership of a 
cause of action and standing to assert it, not to defenses that can properly be 
asserted against those causes of action). 
 102. See infra Part IV (arguing that a plaintiff corporation’s actions should 
be judged by the acts of the corporation, not simply by imputing the wrongdoing 
of one agent to the corporation). 
 103. See Art Metal Works v. Abraham & Straus, 70 F.2d 641, 646 (2d Cir. 
1934) (Hand, J., dissenting), adopted as opinion of the court on r’hrg, 107 F.2d 
944, 944 (2d Cir. 1934) (“It would be monstrous that a man’s conscience should 
bear the sins of those he employs, however liable he may be for their acts, and a 
doctrine which stands upon moral wrongdoing must clear itself of that 
confusion, or adopt another form.”); see also Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 
754 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that “the defense of in pari delicto loses its sting 
when the person who is in pari delicto is eliminated”); Universal Builders, Inc. 
v. Moon Motor Lodge, Inc., 244 A.2d 10, 13 (Pa. 1968) (declining to apply in pari 
delicto when the wrongdoing was done by an officer of the now-bankrupt 
plaintiff corporation because “[t]he attribution of one party’s clean hands to 
another party is not based on simple agency principles”). 
 104. Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(holding that the allegedly negligent auditors could invoke imputation as a 
defense when corporate management committed fraud on behalf of the 
corporation). 
 105. AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 331 (Pa. 2010). 
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It set the stage for a strict application of the in pari delicto 
defense and has served as the foundation for many similar 
outcomes.106 Cenco has, however, been criticized for its simplistic 
approach to the complex intersection of law, policy, and equity.107 
It was undoubtedly a decision (1) highly driven by the specific 
facts before the court108 and (2) reached by a court with specific 
policy goals in mind.109 The Seventh Circuit’s decision one year 
later in Schacht v. Brown110 clarifies how these factors limit the 
holding in Cenco.  
First, a brief look at the facts of Cenco. Over the course of five 
years, Cenco managers inflated inventory values to make the 
company appear more valuable, which in turn increased the price 
of its stock.111 The company’s apparently strong position allowed 
it to buy up other companies “on the cheap” and borrow money at 
                                                                                                     
 106. See, e.g., Dore, supra note 46, at 161 (noting the courts that have 
expressly or implicitly followed Cenco); see also In re CBI Holding Co., Inc., 311 
B.R. 350, 370 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Cenco suggests that courts should focus on 
who bore the ‘primary costs’ of the fraud—stockholders, or outsiders to the 
corporation—rather than on the purpose behind the fraud.”); Kirschner v. 
KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 952 (N.Y. 2010) (noting that the Second Circuit’s 
approach to in pari delicto is “heavily influenced by” Cenco). 
 107. See AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 826 & n.241 (Del. Ch. 2009) (finding that 
Cenco simplifies complexities with “articulation[s] [that] ignore[] all nuance and 
several alternatives to avoiding an unreasonably harsh treatment of the 
auditors”); AHERF, 989 A.2d at 331–32 (discussing critique of Cenco and 
holding that Pennsylvania law does not accord with the notion that 
incentivizing internal corporate monitoring should take priority “over the 
objectives of the traditional schemes governing liability in contract and in tort”); 
Andrew J. Morris, Some Challenges for Legal Pragmatism, 28 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 
1, 18–41 (criticizing Cenco for its reliance on highly abstract principles and 
pragmatic reasoning to create new law after being hasty in its determination 
that no existing case law provided guidance). 
 108. See Cenco, 686 F.2d at 456 (declining to rule that an auditor is never 
liable for the frauds of its employees, but finding that on the uncontested facts of 
this case the corporation should not be allowed to shift the entire responsibility 
for the fraud to its auditors). 
 109. See id. at 455 (“In predicting how the Illinois courts might decide the 
present case, we assume they would be guided by the underlying objectives of 
tort liability. Those objectives are to compensate the victims of wrongdoing and 
to deter future wrongdoing.”). 
 110. See Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1347 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that 
plaintiff’s complaint adequately stated a claim under the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act and that the claim was not defeated by Cenco). 
 111. See Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 451 (7th Cir. 
1982) (presenting the facts of the case). 
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low rates.112 The fraud was eventually discovered and led to a 
class action suit by Cenco stockholders against Cenco, its corrupt 
managers, and its auditor Seidman & Seidman (Seidman).113 The 
class of stock purchasers settled with Seidman, leaving before the 
court the cross-claims by Cenco and Seidman.114 Cenco alleged 
that Seidman was liable to it for failing to prevent the fraud, and 
Seidman alleged that it was a victim of the fraud and thus 
entitled to damages.115 
The court found for Seidman because the fraudulent acts of 
Cenco’s managers, which were done on behalf of the corporation, 
were attributable to Cenco.116 Judge Posner declared: “Fraud on 
behalf of a corporation is not the same thing as fraud against 
it.”117 In this case, the stockholders had received a benefit from 
the fraud and outsiders had borne the primary costs. Judge 
Posner was not willing to allow stockholders to escape all 
responsibility for the fraud.118 
This famous language from Cenco has been used to foreclose 
suits against an auditor brought by or on behalf of a fraudulent 
corporation.119 But the decision is not always considered in light 
of the Seventh Circuit’s clarification in Schacht.120 The Schacht 
court advised that three important factors existed in Cenco: 
(1) the shareholders who would benefit from a successful recovery 
were the corrupt officers themselves,121 (2) the plaintiffs would 
possibly receive a double recovery after a previous successful 
recovery in a direct suit against the defendants,122 and 
(3) deterrence would not be furthered by a holding for the 
                                                                                                     
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. at 456. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id.  
 119. See cases cited supra note 106 (citing cases that have followed Cenco to 
prevent plaintiffs’ recovery from the corporation’s auditor). 
 120. See Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1347 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding that 
Cenco’s “underlying policy [does not] forbid[] the Director from maintaining the 
present action” (emphasis added)). 
 121. Id. at 1348. 
 122. Id. at 1349. 
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plaintiffs because (i) the directors would recover as shareholders 
and (ii) large corporate shareholders had been in a position to 
police the plaintiff’s corrupt officers.123  
Without facts that would lead to compensating 
wrongdoers,124 and when deterring wrongdoing required the 
opposite result,125 the Schacht court adhered to the guiding 
principles of tort liability to abandon the outcome that had 
furthered these principles under the facts of Cenco.126 Different 
facts required a different result.  
Of course, different law applied as well.127 In Cenco, the court 
was predicting how Illinois courts would decide the issue under 
Illinois common law and in Schacht the court applied a federal 
statute and was able to “bring to bear federal policies in deciding 
the estoppel question.”128 But no federal policies were advanced to 
justify a different outcome. In fact, the court proceeded by 
                                                                                                     
 123. Id. 
 124. See id. at 1348. Unlike the wrongdoing-shareholder plaintiffs in Cenco, 
the plaintiffs first in line to recover in Schacht were policyholders and creditors; 
shareholders were last in line to recover. See id. (noting that “under the 
distribution provisions of the governing liquidation statute, it is the 
policyholders and creditors who have first claim”). 
 125. See id. at 1349 (“There is also no evidence here of the existence of large 
corporate shareholders capable of conducting an independent audit, as in Cenco, 
and whose lack of investigatory zeal would be rewarded by a decision favorable 
to the [plaintiff].”) 
 126. See id. at 1348 (finding that a “Cenco-type analysis” would not yield the 
results defendants urged). 
 127. See id. at 1347 (noting that the Cenco court was 
“merely . . . attempt[ing] to divine how Illinois courts would decide th[e] issue,” 
but that the present cause of action arose under a federal statute giving the 
court a clean slate on which to write). 
 128. Id. The court addressed the issue as one of estoppel. See id. at 1346 
(presenting defendants’ argument that plaintiff should be estopped from 
proceeding because he stood in the shoes of a corporation imputed with its 
officers’ and directors’ illegal conduct); see also Integrity Ins. Co. v. Yegen 
Holdings Corp. (In re Integrity), 573 A.2d 928, 941–42 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1990) (“[E]ven though an agent (the directors and officers) of a principal 
(Integrity) may be responsible for falsity, the third party’s ([the auditor]) 
culpability, if established, would estop it from raising the defense of 
imputation.”). While this Note focuses on the defense of in pari delicto, a 
plaintiff imputed with the fraud of corporate officers invites other defenses such 
as estoppel, or inability to prove causation under a fraud claim. See Schacht v. 
Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1346 n.2 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that an estoppel defense 
or the inability to prove causation in a fraud claim “raise the same issue”). See 
supra note 72 for further discussion on this point. 
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analyzing the issue “[as] if the estoppel holding in Cenco were 
relevant.”129  
The distinction between the fraudulent acts in Schacht and 
those in Cenco is a thin one. In Cenco, “those involved in the 
fraud were not stealing from the company, as in the usual 
corporate fraud case, but were instead aggrandizing the company 
(and themselves) at the expense of outsiders.”130 This was fraud 
on behalf of the corporation. In Schacht, by contrast, the 
directors’ fraudulent action pushed the corporation past its point 
of insolvency and systematically looted its most profitable 
business, aggravating its insolvency.131 This, according to the 
court, is not a benefit to the corporation.132 The court found that 
“it defies common sense to suggest that a parent corporation’s 
shareholders are not injured when their directors fraudulently 
prop up, drain, and thereby deepen the insolvency of a subsidiary 
for whose liabilities the shareholders will eventually be liable.”133  
The difference seems slight—as the shareholders in both 
instances will ultimately suffer134—and not one on which the 
decision to insulate auditors from liability should turn. The key to 
reconciling the two cases and, more importantly, to gleaning a 
rule from them, is to recognize that the Cenco decision was driven 
by the court’s desire to effectuate the two underlying objectives of 
tort liability: (1) to compensate victims and (2) to deter future 
wrongdoing.135 
                                                                                                     
 129. Id. at 1348 (“[E]ven if a Cenco-type analysis were applied to the instant 
case . . . it would not yield the result that defendants urge, i.e., estoppel of the 
Director based on the imputation to Reserve of the directors’ knowledge of 
fraud.”). 
 130. Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 451 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 131. See Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1347–48 (contrasting the Cenco facts to those 
of the instant case). 
 132. See id. at 1348 (“In no way can these results be described as beneficial 
to Reserve.”). 
 133. Id. at 1348 n.4. 
 134. See, e.g., Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 955 (N.Y. 2010) 
(noting that “a company victimized by fraud is always likely to suffer long-term 
harm once the fraud becomes known” (emphasis added)). 
 135. See Cenco, 686 F.2d at 455 (“Th[e] objectives [of tort liability] are to 
compensate the victims of wrongdoing and to deter future wrongdoing.”); see 
also Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1348 (7th Cir. 1983) (“In Cenco we 
undertook a two-pronged analysis to determine whether such imputation should 
occur: whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff corporation would properly 
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This is important for two reasons. First, to the extent a court 
follows Cenco and strives to compensate victims and deter future 
wrongdoing, its outcome will be uniquely fact dependent.136 And 
second, courts have failed to apply this Cenco “approach” to the 
facts at hand but rather have broadly applied its holding without 
the underlying tort-liability-objectives analysis.137 In many cases, 
this has led to auditors being insulated from liability.138 
Assuredly not all of these cases produced the wrong result, but to 
the extent that the Cenco decision created a monster, its actual 
lesson should be reconsidered. 
2. New Jersey 
The New Jersey Supreme Court did just that in NCP 
Litigation Trust v. KPMG.139 Here, a trust, on behalf of NCP 
creditors and shareholders, brought a negligence claim against 
KPMG for failure to perform its audits in conformity with GAAS 
and GAAP140 standards.141 The court held that the in pari delicto 
defense142 is not available to one who “contributed to” the 
                                                                                                     
compensate the victims of the wrongdoing, and whether such recovery would 
deter future wrongdoing.”). 
 136. See, e.g., Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1348–49 (allowing the plaintiff’s claim to 
proceed under slightly different facts than Cenco because application of the 
compensation and deterrence principles did not bar suit). 
 137. See, e.g., Dore, supra note 46, at 143 (noting that the Fifth Circuit in 
F.D.I.C. v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992), “adopts Cenco’s benefit 
test to resolve imputation and adverse interest problems without evaluating 
Judge Posner’s underlying rationale for the test: its alleged consistency with tort 
law’s twin goals of compensation and deterrence”); see also cases cited supra 
note 106 (citing cases that have followed Cenco). 
 138. See, e.g., AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 779 (Del. Ch. 2009) (noting that New 
York law immunizes auditors from suit). 
 139. NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 873 (N.J. 2006) (holding 
that the imputation doctrine does not bar corporate shareholders from 
recovering through a litigation trust against an auditor who was negligent in 
failing to uncover the fraud of corporate officers or directors). 
 140. See id. at 876 (defining GAAS (General Accepted Auditing Standards) 
and GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) as the professional 
guidelines that auditors must adhere to while conducting an audit). 
 141. See id. (presenting the allegations). 
 142. See id. at 879–80 (presenting the imputation doctrine and its rationale). 
The New Jersey Supreme Court does not use the term in pari delicto but refers 
to the defense as the “imputation defense.” Id. The court’s analysis of whether 
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fraud.143 Because the auditor in the case at bar was allegedly 
negligent, it met this standard and was precluded from imputing 
to the corporation (on whose behalf the plaintiffs brought suit) 
the fraudulent acts of the corporation’s agents.144  
In reaching this decision, the court declined to follow Cenco 
for three main reasons. First, Cenco applied Illinois law so the 
court was “writ[ing] on a clean slate in addressing the issue 
under New Jersey law.”145 Second, the court considered how 
Schacht narrowed Cenco’s holding.146 Lastly, the court found that 
barring all shareholders from recovery for the impropriety of 
some shareholders is “unfair and improper.”147 
There are three groups of plaintiffs for whom the court found 
that barring suit would not be unfair: (1) those shareholders who 
engaged in the fraud, (2) those shareholders who knew or should 
have known fraud was taking place, and (3) those who own large 
blocks of stock and therefore arguably possess the ability to 
oversee the company operations.148 For these plaintiffs, 
imputation should be applied and suit against an outside auditor 
should be barred.149 
The court supplied two reasons why innocent shareholders 
should be allowed to bring suit against negligent auditors. First, 
                                                                                                     
the defendant may invoke imputation tracks an analysis of when to apply in 
pari delicto and has been cited in this context. See, e.g., AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 
335 (Pa. 2010) (noting that the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in NCP 
“effectively negat[ed] imputation (and thus barr[ed] the in pari delicto defense)” 
in the negligent-auditor context); see also Thabault v. Chait, 541 F.3d 512, 528 
(3d Cir. 2008) (equating New Jersey’s “imputation defense” with in pari delicto); 
In re Norvergence, Inc., 405 B.R. 709, 745–46 (D.N.J. 2009) (noting plaintiff’s 
argument that under New Jersey law “the imputation defense (and therefore 
the in pari delicto defense) cannot be asserted by the [defendant auditors]”). 
 143. See NCP Litig. Trust, 901 A.2d at 882 (“In sum, we hold that the 
Trust’s suit is not barred because one who contributed to the misconduct cannot 
invoke imputation.”). 
 144. See id. at 881–82 (noting that the New Jersey decision which 
articulated the “contributed to” standard “drew no distinction between negligent 
conduct on the one hand and fraudulent conduct on the other”). 
 145. Id. at 885. 
 146. Id. at 884–85. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 885–86. 
 149. See id. at 886 (stating that the holding with these limitations “properly 
effectuate[s] the tort principle of compensating the victims of wrongdoing by 
allowing only ‘innocent’ shareholders to recover”). 
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“the nature of today’s corporations” makes it unlikely that the 
shareholders of large corporations are in a position to monitor the 
actions of corporate officials.150 Second, auditors are specifically 
retained to monitor corporate activity and the law must seek to 
deter auditor wrongdoing.151 
The court also addressed the distinction between an agent’s 
act which is “adverse to” or “for the benefit of” the corporation. 
The court noted that “there can be difficulty in differentiating 
between whether the malfeasant conduct benefits or harms the 
corporation.”152 But the court found that fraudulent acts of high-
ranking officers which carry the business past the point of 
insolvency cannot be considered a benefit to the corporation.153 
Lastly, the court noted that New Jersey is a comparative 
negligence state so the corporation and its shareholders retain 
good reason to carefully monitor the transactions of the 
corporation and its management.154 
3. Pennsylvania 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania addressed the 
intersection of imputation and the in pari delicto defense in the 
context of a claim by a committee of creditors (the Committee) 
against a bankrupt corporation’s auditor.155 The Committee 
                                                                                                     
 150. See id. (disagreeing with Cenco that imputation must be applied to 
deter future wrongdoing). 
 151. See id. (“[O]ur focus cannot be limited only to deterring wrongdoing on 
the part of corporate shareholders.”). 
 152. See id. at 887–88 (citing Debra A. Winiarsky, Litigating an 
Accountant’s Liability Suit—Contributory Negligence and Third Party Practice, 
SC46 A.L.I.-A.B.A 315, 326 (1998), who proposes that “almost any situation 
involving management fraud can be seen as either aimed at harming or 
benefitting the company”). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. The court suggests that any benefit the corporation received from its 
agent’s fraud should not be a complete bar to liability but “only a factor in 
apportioning damages.” Id. 
 155. See AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 339 (Pa. 2010) (holding that Pennsylvania 
will recognize the in pari delicto defense in the negligent-auditor context, but 
that imputation is unavailable to an auditor who has not proceeded in material 
good faith by colluding with the agent to fraudulently misstate corporate 
finances). 
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alleged that the auditors colluded with company officials to 
fraudulently misstate financials.156 Specifically, the court 
addressed the following issue certified to it by the Third Circuit: 
should corporate officers’ knowledge of alleged fraud and 
complicity be imputed to the corporation, “thereby exposing it to 
an application of the in pari delicto doctrine and/or other defenses 
which might arise . . . against an active wrongdoer proceeding 
volitionally.”157 
In analyzing whether the officers’ knowledge should be 
imputed to the corporation, the court examined the adverse 
interest exception. It noted that the controversy surrounding the 
appropriate application of the adverse interest exception has 
focused on either (1) the degree of self-interest required, or (2) the 
quantum of benefit to the corporation necessary to avoid the 
exception’s application (where self-interest is evident).158 The 
court rejected these approaches and instead found that the 
appropriate approach to benefit and self-interest is to consider 
them in relation to the underlying purpose of imputation—fair 
risk allocation.159 The corporation should initially bear the risk of 
any wrongdoing by its agents because it selects the agents and 
implements procedures for monitoring them.160 Innocent third 
parties must be protected when they deal with a corporation’s 
agent.161 
                                                                                                     
 156. See id. at 315 (presenting the allegations against 
PricewaterhouseCooper). 
 157. Id. at 333. 
 158. Id. at 334. 
 159. See id. at 335 (“In light of the competing concerns, the appropriate 
approach to benefit and self-interest is best related back to the underlying 
purpose of imputation which is fair risk-allocation . . . .”); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 cmt. c (2006) (“It is helpful to view questions about 
imputation from the perspective of risk assumption, taking into account the 
posture of the third party whose legal relations with the principal are at issue.”). 
 160. See AHERF, 989 A.2d at 333 (“[I]t is the principal who has selected and 
delegated responsibility to . . . agents; accordingly, the [imputation] doctrine 
creates incentives for the principal to do so carefully and responsibly.”); id. at 
336 (“[I]mputation rules justly operate to protect third parties on account of 
their reliance on an agent’s actual or apparent authority.”). 
 161. See id. at 333 (“Imputation . . . serves to protect those who transact 
business with a corporation through its agents believing the agent’s conduct is 
with the authority of the principal.”). 
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But when the third party is on notice that the agent is acting 
adversely to the corporation and will not share his knowledge 
with the corporation, the third party no longer merits the 
protection that imputation provides.162 In this regard, the court 
found that the appropriate distinction is between those who dealt 
with the company in material good faith and those who did not.163 
a. Those Who Proceed in Good Faith 
The court held that the in pari delicto defense is available in 
the negligent-auditor context—that is, when the corporate 
plaintiff is at least equally culpable relative to the subject of its 
lawsuit.164 Because Pennsylvania law already applied 
contributory negligence in the accounting context, the court found 
that allowing the in pari delicto defense “dovetail[ed] with other 
defenses which may be available to a negligent auditor.”165 The 
court noted that the adverse interest exception is applicable to 
determine if the agent’s acts will be imputed to the corporation 
and that the determination will turn on the “traditional, liberal 
test for corporate benefit.”166  
A benefit to the corporation should be evaluated “in light of 
the reasonable perspective of a third party in its dealing with the 
agent.”167 The question to ask is: “[W]hether there is sufficient 
lack of benefit (or apparent adversity) such that it is fair to 
charge the third party with notice that the agent is not acting 
with the principal’s authority.”168 The court found this approach 
                                                                                                     
 162. See id. at 336 (“[Imputation] principles do not (and should not) apply in 
circumstances in which the agent’s authority is neither actual nor apparent, as 
where both the agent and the third party know very well that the agent’s 
conduct goes unsanctioned by one or more of the tiers of corporate governance.”). 
 163. See id. at 335 (drawing a “sharp distinction between those who deal in 
good faith with the principal-corporation in material matters and those who do 
not”). 
 164. Id. at 330. 
 165. Id. at 335; see also id. at 335 n.31 (“[U]nder prevailing Pennsylvania 
law as presently established by the Superior Court, contributory negligence in 
the accounting context . . . continues to function as a complete bar to recovery 
under negligence theory.”). 
 166. Id. at 336. 
 167. Id. at 338. 
 168. Id. On this point, see also McRaith v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 909 N.E.2d 
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to be consistent with the core concept of apparent authority in the 
first instance.169  
Because the court combined the benefit analysis with the 
risk-allocation purpose of imputation, it applied a different 
benefit test in the collusive-auditor context.170 In a setting 
involving auditors who have not proceeded in material good faith, 
the court held that a “knowing, secretive, fraudulent 
misstatement of corporate financial information” will never be a 
benefit to a corporation.171 But this type of misstatement could 
provide a benefit to the corporation in the negligent-auditor 
context which would foreclose the adverse interest exception, 
permit imputation, and allow the in pari delicto defense.172 
b. Those Who Do Not Proceed in Good Faith 
When outsiders are “in” on the fraud, the court found that 
the “ordinary rationale for imputation breaks down 
completely.”173 The agent’s authority in this case is neither actual 
nor apparent.174 Both the agent and the third party “know very 
well that the agent’s conduct goes unsanctioned by one or more of 
the tiers of corporate governance.”175 To impute the agent’s 
knowledge to the corporation in this case would be to charge the 
                                                                                                     
310, 331 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (explaining that the adverse interest exception 
“suspends the operation of the general rule when the circumstances are such as 
to raise a clear presumption that the agent will not perform [his] duty, and thus 
that the principal will not in fact receive and have the benefit of the agent’s 
knowledge”). 
 169. See AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 338 (Pa. 2010) (“Notably, such approach 
dovetails with the core concept of apparent authority in the first instance.”). 
 170. See id. at 336, 338 (providing different tests for corporate benefit in the 
negligent-auditor and collusive-auditor contexts). 
 171. Id. at 338. 
 172. See id. at 335 (“On balance, we believe the best course is for 
Pennsylvania common law to continue to recognize the availability of the in pari 
delicto defense (upon appropriate and sufficient pleadings and proffers), via the 
necessary imputation, in the negligent-auditor context.”). 
 173. Id. at 336. 
 174. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the rule that an agent has no 
authority to bind her principal when the third party with whom she deals knows 
her acts go unsanctioned). 
 175. AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 336 (Pa. 2010). 
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corporation with knowledge “as against a third party whose 
agents actively and intentionally prevented those in [the] 
governing structure who were non-participants in the fraud from 
acquiring such knowledge.”176 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
found that “[s]uch an application of the imputation doctrine 
seems ill-advised, if not perverse.”177 
In relation to the public policy reasons for the in pari delicto 
defense, the court disagreed with the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion 
in Cenco.178 The court found that the importance of a policy that 
incentivizes internal corporate monitoring is trumped by 
“objectives of the traditional schemes of governing liability in 
contract and in tort, including fair compensation and deterrence 
of wrongdoing.”179 
4. New York 
a. Majority Opinion 
The New York Court of Appeals considered two separate 
disputes in its Kirschner v. KPMG LLP180 decision: (1) a litigation 
trust bringing suit against many defendants on behalf of the now-
bankrupt corporation’s unsecured creditors alleging that the 
defendants either aided and abetted the corporate insiders in 
carrying out the fraud, or were negligent in not discovering it,181 
and (2) a derivative action against an auditor alleging that the 
auditor’s performance was not in accordance with professional 
standards.182 The court began by affirming its commitment to the 
                                                                                                     
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See id. at 332 (“Pennsylvania law does not accord with Cenco in terms 
of the degree to which the decision, in an auditor-liability context, prioritizes the 
policy of incentivizing the internal corporate monitoring over the objectives of 
the traditional schemes governing liability in contract and in tort . . . .”). 
 179. Id. 
 180. See Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 959 (N.Y. 2010) (holding 
that the doctrine of in pari delicto will bar a derivative claim under New York 
law where a corporation sues its outside auditor for professional malpractice or 
negligence in failing to detect fraud committed by the corporation). 
 181. See id. at 946 (considering questions certified from the Second Circuit). 
 182. See id. at 949 (considering a question certified by the Delaware 
Supreme Court). 
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in pari delicto doctrine, which is grounded in “fundamental 
concept[s] of morality and fair dealings.”183 
The court used agency principles to find that the corporate 
officers’ acts were imputed to the principal in these cases because 
they were acting within the scope of their corporate authority.184 
It recognized that the adverse interest exception to imputation 
would be available if the agent had “totally abandoned his 
principal’s interests and [was] acting entirely for his own or 
another’s purpose.”185 But where, as here, both the agent and the 
principal realized a benefit, the agent’s act was imputed to the 
principal.186 The time at which to consider whether or not the 
agent’s act is adverse to the principal is the time at which the act 
was committed.187 Therefore, a corporation’s ultimate demise is 
not evidence of an adverse act by the agent.188 If the agent’s act 
was designed to enhance the corporation’s financial performance 
at the time, the agent was not acting adversely to the interests of 
the principal.189 
The court noted the strong policy reasons for leaving the 
imputation principles untouched by exception, most importantly 
that “imputation fosters an incentive for a principal to select 
honest agents and delegate duties with care.”190 The court 
pointed out that the adverse interest exception has a narrow 
                                                                                                     
 183. Id. at 950. 
 184. See id. at 951 (noting that everyday activities central to a company’s 
operations and well-being such as “issuing financial statements, accessing 
capital markets, handling customer accounts, moving assets between corporate 
entities, and entering into contracts” fall within the scope of corporate officers’ 
authority). 
 185. See id. at 952 (citing Center v. Hampton Affiliates, 488 N.E.2d 828, 
829–30 (N.Y. 1985) and adding emphasis). 
 186. See id. (noting that New York’s formulation of the adverse interest 
exception avoids ambiguity where there is a benefit to both the insider and the 
corporation). 
 187. See id. at 953 (noting that “the mere fact that a corporation is forced to 
file for bankruptcy does not determine whether its agents’ conduct was, at the 
time it was committed, adverse to the company”). 
 188. Id. 
 189. See id. (“So long as the corporate wrongdoer’s fraudulent conduct 
enables the business to survive—to attract investors and customers and raise 
funds for corporate purposes—th[e] test [for the adverse interest exception] is 
not met.”). 
 190. Id. at 951–52. 
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scope.191 If the disclosure of corporate fraud were to trigger the 
application of the exception then “a corporation would be able to 
invoke the adverse interest exception and disclaim virtually every 
corporate fraud—even a fraud undertaken for the corporation’s 
benefit—as soon as it was discovered and no longer helping the 
company.”192 
The court noted that no one contests that traditional 
imputation principles are essential in other contexts.193 The 
plaintiffs here, it noted, were only suggesting the rules be revised 
in the in pari delicto context.194 The court rejected this 
suggestion; it found its current rules in this context to be 
workable and anchored in sound public policy.195 Why, for 
instance, should the innocent shareholders of the auditing or 
accounting firms be “held responsible for the sins of their errant 
agents while the innocent stakeholders of the corporation itself 
are not charged with knowledge of their wrongdoing agents”?196 
The court concluded that the doctrine of in pari delicto will bar a 
derivative claim where a corporation attempts to sue its outside 
auditor for failure to detect fraud committed by the 
corporation.197 
b. Dissenting Opinion 
Three judges of seven disagreed that the in pari delicto 
doctrine supports such a hard-line stance.198 The doctrine, they 
argued, is premised on “concepts of morality, fair dealings, and 
                                                                                                     
 191. See id. at 952 (“The rationale for the adverse interest exception 
illustrates its narrow scope.”). 
 192. Id. at 953. 
 193. See id. at 954 (“No one disputes that traditional imputation principles, 
including a narrowly confined adverse interest exception, should remain 
unchanged—indeed, are essential—in other contexts.”). 
 194. See id. (“Although they do not stress the point, [plaintiffs’] proposals to 
revise imputation rules are limited to in pari delicto cases.”). 
 195. See id. at 959 (“The principles of in pari delicto and 
imputation, . . . which are embedded in New York law, remain sound.”). 
 196. Id. at 958. 
 197. Id. at 959. 
 198. See id. at 960 (“The principles underlying [agency law and the in pari 
delicto] doctrine do not support such a hard-line stance.”). 
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justice,” which should be shaped to the particulars of an 
individual case.199 The adverse interest exception was created 
because, when an “agent is engaged in a scheme to defraud his 
principal,” the presumption of agency law—that the knowledge 
held by the agent was disclosed to the principal—fails.200 The 
dissent agreed that the exception requires a showing of harm to 
the principal, but it found that harm in insider fraud.201 It 
reasoned that giving the corporation longer life through fraud is 
“not a true benefit.”202 
The dissent expressed concern that the public interest is not 
served by immunizing gatekeeper professionals.203 It approved of 
the exceptions to imputation and in pari delicto recognized by 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania.204 Specifically, the dissent would 
“recognize a carve-out or exception to the in pari delicto doctrine 
for cases involving corporate insider fraud enabled by complicit or 
negligent outside gatekeeper professionals.”205 
5. Delaware 
The Delaware Court of Chancery has not directly addressed, 
under Delaware law, whether an auditor may raise the in pari 
delicto defense against a plaintiff suing on behalf of a corporation 
imputed with its agents’ fraud. But it has considered imputation 
and the in pari delicto defense separately under Delaware law 
and together applying New York law.206  
                                                                                                     
 199. Id. at 961. 
 200. Id. (citing Center v. Hampton Affiliates, Inc., 488 N.E.2d 828, 829 (N.Y. 
1985)). 
 201. See id. at 962 (“It is axiomatic that the adverse interest exception 
requires a showing of harm to the principal . . . .”). 
 202. See id. (“[I]nsider fraud that merely gives the corporation life longer 
than it would naturally have is not a true benefit to the corporation but can be 
considered a harm.”). 
 203. See id. (“Important policy concerns militate against the strict 
application of these agency principles.”). 
 204. See id. at 963 (“For these and other reasons, our sister courts in New 
Jersey and Pennsylvania have carved out exceptions or limitations to the 
imputation and in pari delicto rules.”). 
 205. Id. at 964. 
 206. See generally AIG II, 976 A.2d 872 (Del. Ch. 2009) (addressing in pari 
delicto raised by co-conspirators who were not auditors and the adverse interest 
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First, in In re American International Group, Inc., 
Consolidated Derivative Litigation (AIG I),207 derivative plaintiffs 
brought suit against AIG’s auditor PricewaterhouseCooper for 
malpractice and breach of contract.208 Then-Vice Chancellor, now 
Chancellor Strine, writing for the Court of Chancery, held that 
New York law applied and required dismissal because “New York 
law immunizes an auditor’s breach of its professional duty of care 
where it fails to discover a fraud committed by a corporation’s top 
insiders.”209 In so holding, Strine was clear that Delaware law 
would not necessarily reach a similar outcome.210 
Second, in the identically titled In re American International 
Group, Inc., Consolidated Derivative Litigation (AIG II),211 the 
court considered the derivative plaintiffs’ claim against non-
auditor co-conspirators.212 Here, Delaware law applied and the 
Court of Chancery, again through Chancellor Strine, dismissed 
the claim because in pari delicto barred the plaintiffs—acting on 
behalf of the corporation—from recovering from third-party co-
conspirators. In these recent cases, Delaware’s Court of Chancery 
presents its position in support of a strong in pari delicto defense, 
but not to immunize auditors.213 These cases offer helpful critique 
of New York’s extreme position—to immunize auditors in all 
cases—and offer suggestions on how the law could do better. 
                                                                                                     
exception under Delaware law); AIG I, 965 A.2d 763 (Del. Ch. 2009) (addressing 
imputation, the adverse interest exception, and in pari delicto applying New 
York law). 
 207. See AIG I, 965 A.2d at 831 (holding that under New York law in pari 
delicto barred the shareholder derivative claims against AIG’s auditor). 
 208. See id. at 776 (presenting plaintiff’s claim against 
PricewaterhouseCooper). 
 209. Id. at 779. 
 210. See id. at 828 & n.246 (presenting seven reasons why Chancellor Strine 
would be “chary about following the New York approach”). 
 211. See AIG II, 976 A.2d at 877 (holding that a corporation may not recover 
against its third-party co-conspirators). 
 212. See id. at 875–77 (presenting the derivative plaintiffs’ claims against an 
insurance broker, an insurer, a reinsurance corporation, and their subsidiaries). 
 213. See id. at 895 & n.60 (finding that in pari delicto should bar a 
corporation’s suit against its co-conspirators but that the corporation “is free to 
go after its own directors, officers, and employees,” and including outside 
auditors in the group of “corporate insiders” from whom the corporation can 
recover). 
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a. The Adverse Interest Exception and In Pari Delicto 
The Court of Chancery’s application of the adverse interest 
exception highlights the exception’s inadequacy in the corporate 
fraud context. In AIG I, Chancellor Strine held that, under New 
York law, the adverse interest exception could not apply because 
the directors and officers acted, in part, to benefit the 
corporation.214 In so finding, the Chancellor was critical of New 
York’s approach to the exception: 
In reaching this conclusion, I note that in applying the in pari 
delicto doctrine, New York law does not embrace the notion 
that any conscious act of a fiduciary causing a corporation to 
break the law is against the corporation’s charter and best 
interests. In the in pari delicto context, what the adverse 
interest test is directed to is whether the insider is essentially 
stealing from the corporation as opposed to engaging in 
improper acts that, even if also self-interested, have the effect 
of benefiting the corporation financially, even if that benefit 
rested on illegal accounting or other illicit conduct.215 
This passage conveys the court’s disagreement with a test for the 
adverse interest exception—in the specific case of applying the 
exception to prevent the in pari delicto defense—that focuses on 
corporate benefit. The court seems to suggest that when an agent 
“engag[ed] in improper acts,” which are contrary to the 
corporation’s charter and best interest,216 the corporation should 
not be barred from recovery by the in pari delicto defense.217 This 
point illustrates that imputation and the adverse interest 
exception are inadequate tools for measuring corporate fault as 
an element of the in pari delicto defense. They do not take into 
account that the agent’s fraud—which should not be deemed 
“adverse” because it is the very act that imputation is designed to 
                                                                                                     
 214. AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 827 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 215. Id. 
 216. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.01 (2007) (“Every corporation 
incorporated under this Act has the purpose of engaging in any lawful 
business . . . .”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2011) (“A corporation may be 
incorporated or organized under this chapter to conduct or promote any lawful 
business or purposes . . . .”). 
 217. See AIG II, 976 A.2d 872, 891 (Del. Ch. 2009) (providing an example to 
illustrate that in pari delicto should give way to allow recovery when a 
corporation is suing a third party who helped an agent harm the corporation). 
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protect third parties against—is contrary to the corporation’s 
interest, lawful purpose, and long-term health.218 This 
inadequacy is further highlighted by the court’s application of the 
exception in AIG II.  
Despite the court’s criticism of New York’s approach in AIG I, 
in AIG II—applying Delaware law—the court followed New 
York’s approach to find that the in pari delicto defense applied. In 
this case, the court did not clearly articulate the rule for the 
adverse interest exception under Delaware law.219 Indeed, the 
court cited to Cenco, a decision that it criticized in AIG I as “free-
wheeling.”220 The AIG II court required, and did not find, “total 
abandonment of the corporation’s interests” for the adverse 
interest exception to apply.221 
This approach is not consistent with prior Delaware law on 
the adverse interest exception.222 Chancellor Strine recently 
                                                                                                     
 218. Cf. Strine et al., supra note 66, at 650 (“When directors knowingly 
cause the corporation to . . . engage in unlawful acts . . . they are disloyal to the 
corporation’s essential nature. By causing the corporation to become a lawless 
rogue, they make the corporation untrue to itself and to the promise underlying 
its own societally authorized birth.”). 
 219. See AIG II, 976 A.2d 872, 891 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“Many courts have 
recognized the so-called ‘adverse-interest exception,’ which permits a 
corporation to sue its co-conspirators when the corporate agent responsible for 
the wrongdoing was acting solely to advance his own personal financial interest, 
rather than that of the corporation itself.” (emphasis added) (citing authority 
from the Second Circuit which applied New York law)). 
 220. AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 826 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 221. AIG II, 976 A.2d at 891. The court hinted that a corporation “should be 
able to sue the third party that helped the fiduciary harm the corporation,” but 
apparently did not find sufficient “harm” to the corporation for that to be 
relevant here. Id. Using a circular justification, the court indicated that to 
prevent a complicit third party from raising the in pari delicto defense, the 
conspirators would have to be “harming” the corporation such that the adverse 
interest exception would apply, which itself would preclude use of in pari 
delicto. See id. (finding that the corporation here could not sue the third party 
which helped its fiduciaries harm it because the fiduciaries were not alleged to 
have totally abandoned the corporation’s interests as would be necessary to 
invoke the adverse interest exception). This may be explained by the court’s 
position in a footnote that the adverse interest exception can be seen as an 
exception either to in pari delicto or to imputation with the same effect. Id. at 
891 n.50. 
 222. See In re HealthSouth Corp. S’holders Litig., 845 A.2d 1096, 1108 n.22 
(Del. Ch. 2003) (“When corporate fiduciaries—such as [the corporation’s] 
managers—have a self-interest in concealing information—such as the falsity of 
the financial statements that they had helped prepare—their knowledge cannot 
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stated: “When corporate fiduciaries—such as [the corporation’s] 
managers—have a self-interest in concealing information—such 
as the falsity of the financial statements that they had helped 
prepare—their knowledge cannot be imputed to the 
corporation.”223 If Delaware applied this rule in all corporate 
fraud cases, the corporate insiders’ fraud would rarely if ever 
impute to the corporation. 
But Delaware did not adhere to this rule in AIG II for three 
possible reasons. First, the identity of the defendant altered the 
court’s willingness to foreclose plaintiff’s recovery. In AIG I, when 
plaintiffs brought suit against AIG’s auditor, the court was highly 
critical of New York’s rule which “immunizes auditors.”224 And on 
the facts of a 2003 case225 when recovery by the plaintiff would 
have been absurd, the court articulated a low standard for the 
adverse interest exception to avoid imputation.226 But in AIG II, 
plaintiffs sought to recover from non-auditor co-conspirators. 
Here, the court favored application of New York’s hard-to-attain 
adverse interest exception and rigid in pari delicto doctrine 
because it sought to avoid helping the corporation shift costs to 
its “partners in crime.”227 
A second reason the court may have applied the adverse 
interest exception differently is that the court is limited by the 
                                                                                                     
be imputed to the corporation.”); Holley v. Jackson, 158 A.2d 803, 808 (Del. Ch. 
1959) (“Ordinarily the knowledge of an agent is imputed to his principal . . . 
[but] where an agent is interested in the result of a transaction adversely to the 
interest of his principal, the rule of imputed knowledge on the part of the 
principal no longer obtains.” (citation omitted)).  
 223. In re HealthSouth Corp., 845 A.2d at 1108 n.22. 
 224. See, e.g., AIG I, 965 A.2d at 779 (holding that the claim must be 
dismissed despite pleading which suggest that the auditor did not live up to its 
responsibilities). 
 225. See In re HealthSouth Corp., 845 A.2d at 1107 (holding that defendant’s 
argument “lack[ed] logical force” when he attempted to invoke the in pari delicto 
defense by imputing his wrongdoing as CEO, and the wrongdoing of his 
subordinates, to the corporation attempting to recover from him). 
 226. See id. (finding that imputing to the corporation the conduct of 
managers to allow the CEO defendant, to whom the managers reported, to raise 
in pari delicto would be “silly”). 
 227. See AIG II, 976 A.2d 872, 894 (Del. Ch. 2009) (finding that as between 
derivative plaintiffs and non-auditor co-conspirators, “[a]dhering to a more 
traditional approach to in pari delicto yields a more productive and efficient 
result”). 
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advocacy of the parties before it.228 The AIG II court was 
unimpressed with the plaintiffs’ arguments against in pari delicto 
which included advancing new exceptions to the doctrine.229 
Lastly, the adverse interest exception and in pari delicto are 
alterable doctrines which have been subject to results-driven 
application.230 Courts apply the adverse interest exception 
inconsistently because it does not address the core issue—the 
corporation’s blameworthiness and the suitability of foreclosing 
its ability to sue a third party.231 
b. Auditors as Defendants 
In dicta, the Court of Chancery in AIG I and AIG II 
presented a clear position on auditor liability in the corporate 
fraud context.232 It found that auditors are more like corporate-
insider agents than outside third parties.233 And because 
“imputation does not furnish a basis on which an agent may 
defend against a claim by the principal,” an auditor likewise 
                                                                                                     
 228. See, e.g., AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 333 (Pa. 2010) (“Common-law decision-
making is subject to inherent limitations, as it is grounded in records of 
individual cases and the advocacy by the parties shaped by those records.”); AIG 
II, 976 A.2d at 884 (admonishing plaintiffs for advancing “several hard to 
distinguish arguments”). 
 229. See AIG II, 976 A.2d at 884 (“[P]laintiffs seek to exploit the squishy 
manner in which some courts have employed the in pari delicto doctrine and to 
avoid dismissal by having this court find that this case falls within some 
‘exception’ to the traditional application of the doctrine.”). 
 230. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing courts’ use of the adverse interest 
exception including carve-outs to the rule created to achieve a just result); see 
also AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 826–27 (Del. Ch. 2009) (noting that “some courts 
applying New York law have arguably strained logic and linguistics to avoid 
applying the adverse interest exception faithfully”). 
 231. See infra Part IV.A (arguing that in pari delicto should only be 
available in those cases where the corporation bears actual fault). 
 232. See AIG II, 976 A.2d at 895 n.60 (“Suits against corporate agents like 
outside auditors are best conceived of as also within the confines of a single 
corporate conspirator and are consistent with the traditional acceptance of 
derivative suits against corporate insiders.”). 
 233. See AIG I, 965 A.2d at 828 n.246 (“Immunizing the auditor does not aid 
genuine third-parties, as such immunity is not necessary for the corporation to 
be held responsible to third-parties for the insiders’ official wrongdoing.” 
(emphasis added)). 
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should not be permitted to invoke imputation.234 Without 
imputation, the court found that an auditor has no basis for an in 
pari delicto defense because “the corporation did not know of the 
illegal conduct and was not at equal fault.”235 
Delaware takes the position that “regardless of whether the 
adverse interest exception is seen as an exception to in pari 
delicto or to imputation, the effect is the same.”236 It is useful, 
however, to keep the agency law principle of imputation distinct 
from the in pari delicto doctrine. The adverse interest exception 
applies only to imputation. And accordingly, asking if a 
corporation knew of the illegal conduct through imputation is 
distinct from asking if the corporation was at equal fault under in 
pari delicto.237 Courts’ use of imputation to find “fault” as an 
element of the in pari delicto defense is misplaced. Separating the 
two doctrines is essential to bringing the right issue—the 
corporation’s wrongdoing—into focus. The questions then become 
whose acts can best capture the acts of “the corporation,” and 
what constitutes wrongdoing?238  
III. Current Law Does Not Adequately Address the Issue 
A. Where the Law Stands at Present: Imputation Sometimes 
While many courts have considered auditor liability in the 
corporate fraud context, their approaches to the issue are varied. 
Some courts have followed the pioneering case of Cenco to rely on 
                                                                                                     
 234. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 cmt. b (2006); see also AIG II, 
976 A.2d 872, 890 n.49 (Del. Ch. 2009) (using the term “corporate agents” to 
encompass both auditors and corporate insiders and noting that “the policy 
basis for allowing . . . derivative suits can easily be seen as justifying claims 
against corporate agents like outside auditors”). 
 235. AIG II, 976 A.2d at 891 n.50. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See infra Part IV (arguing that a corporation’s fault should be 
measured based on the actions of the board, not based on imputation principles 
intended for a different purpose—that of protecting third parties with a claim 
against the corporation). 
 238. See infra Part IV.B (arguing that a corporation should be judged by the 
adequacy of the information gathering and reporting systems implemented by 
the board of directors and carried out by corporate employees).  
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tort-liability objectives.239 These courts will impute the corporate 
officers’ fraud to the corporation if the fraud led to any short-term 
benefit and will rely on this imputation to prevent a party acting 
on behalf of the corporation from pursuing a claim against the 
corporation’s auditor.240 Others have attacked the problem 
focusing primarily on agency law principles.241 This mode of 
analysis will preclude a collusive auditor but not a negligent 
auditor from raising the in pari delicto defense. Because a third 
party who does not deal with a principal in good faith has no 
basis in agency law to invoke imputation, the argument goes, it 
has no basis for the in pari delicto defense.242 Still others have 
used some combination of both or have simply held that, as a 
policy matter, auditors may not invoke imputation.243 Because 
imputation and the adverse interest exception do not squarely 
address the problem, these courts have used policy and fairness 
arguments to conclude that auditors should not be immune from 
liability.244 One commonality among all approaches is a focus on 
                                                                                                     
 239. See, e.g., In re Jack Greenberg, 212 B.R. 76, 90 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (“[I]t 
appears that what the Cenco line of cases adds to the jurisprudence is an 
express recognition, implicit in the earlier imputation cases, that the objectives 
of tort liability are to be the touchstone by which a court should consider the 
invocation of the doctrine.”).  
 240. See, e.g., Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 952 (N.Y. 2010) 
(relying on Cenco to find that the adverse interest exception should not apply, 
and in pari delicto should bar the claim, when the officers’ conduct defrauds 
others for the corporation’s benefit rather than defrauding the corporation 
itself). 
 241. See generally AHERF, 989 A.2d 313 (Pa. 2010) (noting that agency law 
plays a pivotal role in the availability of the in pari delicto defense and 
concluding that auditors accused of fraud may not raise the defense because 
agency law does not allow a complicit third party to invoke imputation). 
 242. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 cmt. b (2006) (“[I]mputation 
protects innocent third parties but not those who know or have reason to know 
that an agent is not likely to transmit material information to the principal.”). 
 243. See, e.g., NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 888 (N.J. 2006) 
(“[Tort] principles, applied in light of the nature of today’s corporations, require 
that [shareholder] suits be permitted and that negligent auditors be held 
responsible for their wrongdoing.”). 
 244. See id. at 885, 888 (discussing the unfairness of “punish[ing] the many 
for the faults of the few,” and explaining that tort principles applied in light of 
the nature of today’s corporation require that auditor malpractice suits be 
permitted). 
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imputation and the adverse interest exception rather than on the 
in pari delicto defense.245 
The use of the in pari delicto defense—an absolute defense 
that precludes the plaintiff from reaching the merits of its case 
and insulates auditors as a group from liability—deserves more 
thoughtful consideration. Notwithstanding Judge Posner’s 
famous declaration that “fraud on behalf of a corporation is not 
the same thing as fraud against it,”246—which led courts and 
advocates to focus on imputation and the adverse interest 
exception—one agent’s fraud should not be the touchstone of an 
analysis into whether the corporation is a wrongdoer in the 
pertinent sense. Imputation and the adverse interest exception 
will be relevant to some claims and defenses in corporate fraud 
cases, but they should not be determinative of allowing or 
disallowing the in pari delicto defense.247 Imputation does not 
carry the burden of showing that a corporate plaintiff is at fault 
for the underlying illegality, which is a necessary element of the 
in pari delicto defense.248 
B. The Direction the Law Should Travel: Imputation 
Should Apply 
1. The Adverse Interest Exception Should Not Apply 
A corporation should be imputed with the knowledge of its 
agents.249 The adverse interest exception to imputation addresses 
a specific, limited set of circumstances.250 It will not and should 
                                                                                                     
 245. See, e.g., AHERF, 989 A.2d at 328 (“The Latin derivation and equitable 
origins of the underlying common-law maxim [of in pari delicto] have been well 
traveled and need not be revisited at length here.”). 
 246. Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 247. See supra note 72 (discussing imputation’s role in other defenses). 
 248. See AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 828 n.246 (Del. Ch. 2009) (finding that New 
York’s approach to imputation and in pari delicto “addresses the issue by rote, 
applying agency principles developed for other purposes”). 
 249. See supra Part II.A (discussing imputation). 
 250. See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 11, at 309 (noting that the adverse 
interest exception addresses the narrow range of cases where the conduct by an 
agent “is so wholly antagonistic to the principal’s interests that the relationship 
between principal and agent could be viewed as severed”). 
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not apply to the vast majority of cases dealing with auditor 
liability in the corporate fraud context.251 Trying to shove the 
square peg of auditor liability into the round hole of the adverse 
interest exception has led to confused rules governing 
imputation.252 
The law should probe why an auditor should or should not be 
permitted to invoke the absolute defense of in pari delicto when it 
is charged with failure to comply with professional standards in 
effectuating its engagement when that compliance is most 
critical.253 Asking whether the corporation retained a short-term 
benefit from its agent’s fraud to trigger the adverse interest 
exception and defeat imputation simply does not get us there. 
2. Imputation Should Not Turn on Whether Auditors Were 
Negligent or Collusive 
Just as inquiries into corporate benefit or an agent’s intent 
do not target the crux of the issue, neither does an approach that 
bifurcates the issue based on whether the auditor was negligent 
or complicit in the fraud.254 As determined in Part II, agency 
principles should defeat imputation against a collusive auditor 
but not against a negligent auditor.255 From a policy standpoint, 
                                                                                                     
 251. See Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 954 (N.Y. 2010) (noting 
that “[n]o one disputes that traditional imputation principles, including a 
narrowly confined adverse interest exception, should remain unchanged—
indeed, are essential—in other contexts”); see also id. (noting that plaintiffs’ 
proposed formulation of the adverse interest exception would push it “up to if 
not beyond the point of extinction”). 
 252. See, e.g., discussion supra Part II.A.1.a (presenting the court-fashioned 
exceptions to the adverse interest exception).  
 253. See AIG I, 965 A.2d at 828 n.246 (praising the New Jersey Supreme 
Court’s approach which treats “in pari delicto differently as to auditors precisely 
because auditors are employed in part as a safeguard against managerial 
financial fraud”). 
 254. See AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 335–36 (Pa. 2010) (holding that, in light of 
the competing concerns at stake, the best course for Pennsylvania is to recognize 
the availability of the in pari delicto defense, via the necessary imputation, in 
the negligent-auditor context but not in the collusive-auditor context). 
 255. See supra Part II.A.2 (determining that in pari delicto should not be 
available to a third party who secretly colluded with the principal’s agent to 
commit fraud—even if the fraud isn’t “adverse” as the term is defined by state 
law); see also AHERF, 989 A.2d at 336 (“[T]he ordinary rationale supporting 
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though, there is no basis for the distinction.256 Fraud is a more 
egregious act, but an unsound audit flawed by negligence is 
equally harmful to the public. And a rule that encourages auditors 
“not to investigate too closely” does not address the need for sound 
audits that help to deter corporate fraud.257 
C. What Is at Stake in Allowing Claims to Proceed 
Against Auditors 
The importance of how courts apply the in pari delicto defense 
in corporate fraud cases is underscored by the general debate over 
whether it is desirable to allow suit against auditors.258 An 
auditor’s role in corporate monitoring is becoming increasingly 
important; it has been the subject of recent legislation such as the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002259 and the 2010 Dodd–Frank Act.260 
The divergent opinions regarding the wisdom of allowing or 
prohibiting suit against auditors are surveyed briefly below. 
                                                                                                     
imputation breaks down completely in scenarios involving secretive, collusive 
conduct between corporate agents and third parties.”). 
 256. See, e.g., supra Part III.C.2.a1 (discussing the important role auditors 
play in informing investors). 
 257. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge 
of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 301, 345 (2004) (“[P]ublic policy 
must seek to minimize the perverse incentives that induce the gatekeeper not to 
investigate too closely.”). 
 258. See, e.g., Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of 
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994) (discussing secondary liability and 
holding that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit 
under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 because the text does not 
prohibit aiding and abetting); see also Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. 
Scientific Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 153 (2008) (holding that investors do not 
have a private right of action under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 against customer and supplier companies who participated in the 
investors’ company’s fraud because the investors did not rely upon their 
statements or representations). 
 259. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2006). 
 260. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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1. Why the Law Should Insulate Auditors 
a. Current Law Should Not Be “Weakened by Exception” 
Application of simple agency principles to the chain of events in 
corporate fraud cases—the existence of an agency relationship, an 
agent’s fraud imputed to the principal corporation, the corporation 
then being blocked from bringing a grievance to court—ends the 
legal issue under one point of view.261 The New York Court of 
Appeals finds that existing law addresses the issue squarely and 
finds no reason that existing law should be “weakened by 
exception.”262 Especially when “there are strong considerations of 
public policy underlying this precedent: imputation fosters an 
incentive for a principal to select honest agents and delegate duties 
with care.”263 
b. The Public Is Best Served by Protecting Auditors 
Proponents of auditor protection also argue that allowing 
fraudulent corporations to shift responsibility to an outside auditor 
will lead to a misallocation of responsibilities.264 A corporation will 
                                                                                                     
 261. See Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 959 (N.Y. 2010) (“[T]he 
principles of in pari delicto and imputation, with its narrow adverse interest 
exception, which are embedded in New York law, remain sound.”). 
 262. Id. at 950 (citing McConnell v. Commonwealth Pictures Corp., 166 
N.E.2d 494 (N.Y. 1960)). 
 263. Id. at 951–52; see also id. at 953 (noting that the presumption of 
imputation reflects the recognition that principals are best suited to police their 
agents); NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 904 (N.J. 2006) (Rivera-
Soto, J., dissenting) (noting that allowing a company to shift the consequences of 
its own fraud may diminish management’s incentive to exercise due care in its 
own responsibilities); AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 322 (Pa. 2010) (presenting 
defendants’ argument that allowing a corporation to sue its auditor would 
unwisely reduce incentives for corporations in selecting and monitoring their 
agents). But see AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 828 n.246 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“I do not 
understand how immunizing the auditors employed to help the independent 
directors monitor will make either stockholders or independent directors better 
monitors. I really do not get that.”). 
 264. See, e.g., Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 957 (framing the issue before the 
court as whether a corporation should be permitted to shift responsibility for 
their own agents’ misconduct to third parties); see also NCP Litig. Trust, 901 
A.2d at 904 (Rivera-Soto, J., dissenting) (noting the argument presented by the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants); AHERF, 989 A.2d at 334 
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inevitably be the primary wrongdoer;265 the auditor’s role is limited 
and secondary.266 Further, to punish the auditor’s innocent 
shareholders rather than the fraudulent corporation’s innocent 
shareholders creates a double standard.267 
Forcing auditors to defend their actions in court could lead to 
“legal extortion.”268 And the fear of liability will change the way 
audits are performed. Audits will become more expensive269 and 
inaccessible to riskier clients such as small businesses with less 
sophisticated internal controls.270 
                                                                                                     
(citing AIG II, 976 A.2d 872, 889 (Del. Ch. 2009)). 
 265. See Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 958 (noting that “the corporation’s agents 
would almost invariably play the dominant role”); see also Cenco Inc. v. Seidman 
& Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1982) (“If [the auditor] failed to police its 
people, [the corporation] failed as or more dramatically to police its own.”). 
 266. See NCP Litig. Trust, 901 A.2d at 904 (Rivera-Soto, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the “auditor’s role in the accurate presentation of a client’s financial 
statement is limited, and most importantly, secondary to that of the client”). But 
see AIG I, 965 A.2d at 828 n.246 (“I question the soundness of premising a legal 
rule on the belief that, in a simplistic binary choice, independent directors are 
better equipped to detect high-level fraud than a company’s auditor.”). 
 267. See Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 958 (N.Y. 2010) (stating 
that allowing corporations to shift responsibility for their own agents’ 
misconduct would create a double standard by which the innocent shareholders 
of the outside professional are held responsible for the sins of their errant 
agents but those of the corporation are not). 
 268. See NCP Litig. Trust, 901 A.2d at 903 n.14 (Rivera-Soto, J., dissenting) 
(finding that the majority’s rule “merely sanctions what is referred to as nothing 
more than legal extortion: seeking a settlement simply because the costs of 
defense are prohibitive”); cf. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 
Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 163 (2008) (fearing in the securities fraud context that 
expanding the cause of action available under § 10(b) would “allow plaintiffs 
with weak claims to extort settlements from innocent companies”). 
 269. See AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 326 (Pa. 2010) (noting the argument of the 
Accountant Institute that allowing the corporation to shift responsibility for its 
wrongdoing would “result in prohibitively expensive audits”). 
 270. See id. at 327 (“[A]ccountants will be forced to be more selective about 
the clients they serve, choosing only those with ‘blue ribbon’ risk management 
and oversight systems, and rejecting those with less sophisticated internal 
controls to minimize the accountant’s litigation risk.”). 
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2. Why the Law Should Not Insulate Auditors 
a. Auditors Should Be Held Accountable for Their Work 
The arguments against isolating auditors from liability turn on 
their role as a gatekeeper. Shareholders rely on third-party 
professionals to monitor the officers and directors of the companies 
in which they invest.271 In reality, most shareholders have no 
control over management and should not be saddled with the 
unrealistic expectation of selecting honest agents.272 And just as the 
law must seek to deter wrongdoing within corporations, it must seek 
to deter auditor wrongdoing.273 To completely isolate such a group 
from the possibility of liability for negligent or fraudulent work 
would be inequitable.274 
                                                                                                     
 271. See NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 886 (N.J. 2006) 
(“[M]any investors play a passive role in the oversight of a firm’s day-to-day 
operations, relying instead on third-party professionals to assist in monitoring 
the corporation’s officers and directors.”); Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 
941, 962 (N.Y. 2010) (Ciparick, J., dissenting) (“Investors rely heavily on 
information prepared by or approved by auditors, accountants, and other 
gatekeeper professionals.”). 
 272. See NCP Litig. Trust, 901 A.2d at 886 (“[T]he nature of today’s 
corporation makes it increasingly unlikely that shareholders of large 
corporations have the ability to effectively monitor the actions of corporate 
officials.”). 
 273. See id. (“[O]ur focus cannot be limited only to deterring wrongdoing on 
the part of corporate shareholders. We must seek to deter wrongdoing on the 
part of corporate auditors.”); Coffee, supra note 257, at 345 (“[P]ublic policy 
must seek to minimize the perverse incentives that induce the gatekeeper not to 
investigate too closely.”). 
 274. See NCP Litig. Trust, 901 A.2d at 890 (“A limited imputation defense 
will properly compensate the victims of corporate fraud without indemnifying 
wrongdoers for their fraudulent activities.”); AHERF, 989 A.2d at 332 (“[W]e are 
cognizant of the special—and crucial—role assumed by independent auditors as 
a check against potential management abuses.”); Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 962 
(Ciparick, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, these simplistic agency principles as applied 
by the majority serve to effectively immunize auditors and other outside 
professionals from liability wherever any corporate insider engages in fraud.”); 
see also id. at 963 (Ciparick, J., dissenting) (“[S]trict imputation rules merely 
invite gatekeeper professionals to neglect their duty to ferret out fraud by 
corporate insiders because even if they are negligent, there will be no damages 
assessed against them for their malfeasance.” (citations omitted)). 
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b. Auditor Liability Need Not Be Uncapped 
Opening auditors to the possibility of liability does not require 
that they be exposed to “uncapped liability” for their negligent 
failure to detect financial fraud by corporate managers.275 This 
concern over keeping the auditor industry healthy can be addressed 
in ways other than complete immunity, such as by capping liability 
at some multiple of audit fees and allowing audit firms full 
indemnification rights against any insider who acted with 
scienter.276 
IV. Proposed Solution 
This Note argues that auditors should not be immune from 
liability for negligent work simply because they performed that 
work for a corporation whose insider directors or officers 
committed fraud. This is not because those fraudulent acts are 
not imputed to the corporation. They are. It is because 
imputation should not be determinative of whether a defendant 
may successfully invoke the in pari delicto defense. Imputation 
requires a court to ask if an agent’s acts were sufficient to ascribe 
legal responsibility to the principal; in pari delicto requires a 
court to ask if the plaintiff bears substantially equal fault for the 
harm it suffered for which it seeks redress.277 These are not the 
same question. 
Imputation plays a different role (1) when the corporation 
defends against suit by a third party, and (2) when it attacks a 
third party, as a plaintiff, for the third party’s wrongdoing that 
harmed the corporation.278 In the first case, imputation ends the 
                                                                                                     
 275. AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 828 n.246 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 276. See id. (noting that the New York approach does not address possible 
solutions to the fear of uncapped liability in a direct or thoughtful way). 
 277. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 
307 (1985) (defining the classic formulation of in pari delicto to include 
situations “where the plaintiff truly bore at least substantially equal 
responsibility for his injury”). 
 278. See AIG I, 965 A.2d at 828 n.246 (criticizing the New York rule which 
combines imputation and in pari delicto to bar claims against an auditor 
because the rule “conflates, in a simplistic way, related, but separate, questions 
of agency”); see also id. (“It is a policy judgment, not some rote conflation of 
contextually different questions of agency, that must determine whether, [like 
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inquiry. It is for this case that agency principles were developed 
and function properly.279 It is also here that the “severe” results 
of imputation are supportable: as between a third party and a 
corporation, the corporation should be held responsible for its 
agent’s acts regardless of fault.280 But in the second case, a 
determination of fault is required and demands a more 
thoughtful analysis than simple agency principles are designed to 
provide.281 Imputation—or, more precisely, the fraud committed 
by the corporation’s agents—will play a role in this analysis, but 
not a determinative one. 
A. In Pari Delicto Should Apply Only if the Corporation Is a 
Wrongdoer 
Auditors use the in pari delicto defense to block suit brought 
on behalf of a corporation imputed with its agents’ fraud. In pari 
delicto literally means “in equal fault,” and is intended to prevent 
a “deliberate wrongdoer from recovering from a co-conspirator or 
accomplice.”282 An element of the defense, then, is that the 
corporate plaintiff be a wrongdoer.283  
                                                                                                     
an inside director accused of negligence], an auditor should face liability for 
professional negligence to its client corporation in similar circumstances.”); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (2006) (“Knowledge, including 
imputed knowledge, is not always determinative of, and sometimes is not even 
relevant to, certain claims and defenses.”). 
 279. See DeMott, supra note 11, at 292–93 (“Treating nations and 
corporations as legally consequential persons necessitates doctrines—like 
imputation and other agency-law doctrines—that explain how such persons may 
take action in the physical world with legal consequences.”). 
 280. See id. at 319 (noting that a principal should be liable to third parties 
“even when the principal was without fault in selecting or monitoring the 
agent”). 
 281. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (2006) (stating 
that a principal’s claim against an auditor “should not be defeated by imputing 
to the principal its agents’ knowledge of deficiencies in the processes under 
scrutiny”); see also AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 828 n.246 (Del. Ch. 2009) (finding that 
New York’s approach to imputation and in pari delicto “addresses the issue by 
rote, applying agency principles developed for other purposes”). 
 282. Baena v. KPMG LLP, 453 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2006) (applying in pari 
delicto to bar plaintiff’s claim under Massachusetts law). 
 283. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 
307 (1985) (defining the classic formulation of in pari delicto to include 
situations “where the plaintiff truly bore at least substantially equal 
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Only if the corporation is at fault in a meaningful sense of 
the term should the corporation be deemed a wrongdoer, and only 
then should the defense of in pari delicto apply.284 Imputing the 
act of an agent should not be enough. Fault is not necessary, nor 
even relevant to, the process of imputation.285 Agency doctrines 
are “not fault-based; the legal consequences of an agent’s actions 
are attributable to a principal even when the principal was 
without fault in selecting or monitoring the agent.”286 
That the corporation may not be at fault even though an 
agent committed fraudulent acts becomes especially apparent 
when one considers that an auditor, who was retained for the very 
purpose of monitoring corporate activity, failed to meet its 
professional standards.287 What is more, it is only in those cases 
where the very thing auditors are retained to help guard 
against—fraud—exists that the in pari delicto defense has 
worked to immunize auditors from answering for their own 
potential wrongdoing.288 A corporation doing everything right 
should not be barred from seeking redress for harm that it 
                                                                                                     
responsibility for his injury”). 
 284. Cf. F.D.I.C. v. O’Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d 744, 751 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(“We conclude that ADSB has a corporate identity distinct from that of its 
wrongdoing officers.”). 
 285. See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 11, at 319 (“Basic agency doctrines are not 
fault-based . . . .”). 
 286. Id. 
 287. See AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 828 n.246 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“[A]lthough 
auditors give no warranty that they can detect fraud, the requirement for public 
companies to employ auditors is in large measure inspired by the recognition 
that corporate insiders have more than rarely been known to engage in financial 
shenanigans.”); see also NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 886 (N.J. 
2006) (“[T]hird-party auditors are specifically retained for the task of monitoring 
corporate activity.”). 
 288. See AIG I, 965 A.2d at 828 n.246 (“[I]mmunizing auditors in situations 
when, but for the auditor’s professional negligence, wrongful managerial 
behavior may have been stopped before it resulted in grievous harm relieves the 
audit firm of any responsibility in one of the circumstances when the auditor’s 
compliance with its professional standard of care is most critical.”); AIG II, 976 
A.2d 872, 890 n.49 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“[T]here is a strong argument to be made 
that [gatekeeper professionals like auditors] ought to be accountable for their 
malpractice and not be immunized by the very actions that were not discovered 
due to their failure to meet expected professional standards.”). 
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suffered based solely on the existence of a fraudulent agent 
somewhere in its ranks.289 
Not every corporation, perhaps not most, will fit this mold. In 
Cenco, for example, the massive fraud involved the chairman and 
president, a number of vice presidents, and other top 
management; and the evidence suggested that those directors not 
involved were “negligent in allowing [the fraud] to flourish 
undetected beneath their noses.”290 This was not a case of one or 
several rogue agents committing fraud. Many parties with control 
used the corporation to engage in massive fraud. Here, it would 
be fair to consider the corporation a wrongdoer and bar it from 
bringing a claim before the court. Relying on simple imputation 
principles to reach this result, however, “conflates, in a simplistic 
way, related, but separate, questions of agency.”291 To determine 
a corporation’s fault, then, the law can and should look 
elsewhere. 
B. Measuring Fault to Determine if the Corporation Is 
a Wrongdoer 
A corporation can only act through its agents.292 Any attempt 
to judge a corporation will be limited by this reality. But this 
limitation should not be fatal to an attempt at better measuring a 
corporation’s actions than through simple agency principles.293 
One possible solution is to assess a corporation’s fault based on 
the information gathering and reporting systems that the board 
of directors has in place to deter and detect fraud. Corporate law 
                                                                                                     
 289. See, e.g., In re NM Holdings Co., LLC, 411 B.R. 542, 550 (E.D. Mich. 
2009) (“The rationale for applying the sole actor exception [and imputing the 
agent’s fraud] is much weaker where the wrongdoer is not the sole shareholder 
because the identity between the corporation and the wrongdoer is more 
attenuated in such cases.”). 
 290. Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 451 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 291. AIG I, 965 A.2d at 828 n.246. 
 292. See, e.g., Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 950 (N.Y. 2010) 
(“Corporations are not natural persons. Of necessity, they must act solely 
through the instrumentality of their officers or other duly authorized agents.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 293. See AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 828 n.246 (Del. Ch. 2009) (finding that auditor 
liability should be addressed in a “direct or thoughtful way,” not “by rote, 
applying agency principles developed for other purposes”).  
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supports the proposition that the policies implemented by the 
board of directors are a good measure of a corporation’s acts.  
Upon incorporation, every corporation will create articles of 
incorporation, adopt bylaws, and elect a board of directors.294 The 
board of directors will then appoint officers to function in the 
capacity set forth in the bylaws, generally management of the 
day-to-day operations.295 The officers remain under the direction, 
and subject to the oversight, of the board of directors.296 In 
addition to selecting corporate management, the board of 
directors must implement information gathering and reporting 
systems to keep informed.297 These systems must monitor the 
activities of both high-level managers and lower-level employees 
to allow the board and senior management to “reach informed 
judgments concerning . . . the corporation’s compliance with 
law.”298 Failure to assure that such systems exist would be a 
breach of the board’s fiduciary duty to shareholders and could 
render directors personally liable to shareholders for harm 
caused by the failure.299   
Through this structure, all corporate activity and corporate 
policy originates from the board of directors. The systems put in 
place and implemented by the board of directors, then, may 
provide the best yardstick by which to measure a corporation’s 
acts.300 If the corporation’s reporting systems are inadequate to 
                                                                                                     
 294. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 2.02, 2.05, 2.06 (2007). 
 295. See, e.g., id. § 8.41 (“Each officer has the authority and shall perform 
the functions set forth in the bylaws, or to the extent consistent with the bylaws, 
the functions prescribed by the board of directors . . . .”). 
 296. See id. § 8.01 (“All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the 
authority of the board of directors of the corporation, and the business and 
affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction, and 
subject to the oversight, of its board of directors . . . .”). 
 297. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 
(Del. Ch. 1996) (“[A] director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith 
to assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which the board 
concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so . . . may . . . render a 
director liable for losses caused by non-compliance . . . .”). 
 298. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 368 (Del. 2006) (citing Caremark, 698 
A.2d at 967). 
 299. See, e.g., Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970 (noting that a failure may render 
directors liable for losses caused by noncompliance); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT § 8.31 (presenting the standards of liability for directors). 
 300. Cf. Morris v. Union Pac. R.R., 373 F.3d 896, 902 (8th Cir. 2004) (“When 
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the goal of detecting and deterring insider fraud, the corporation 
can fairly be deemed a “knowing and substantial participant” in 
the fraud.301 And it can fairly be precluded by the in pari delicto 
defense from recovering from others who were part of the 
illegality.  
The question of by what standard the adequacy of corporate 
systems should be measured remains. The line separating 
adequate from inadequate systems would attempt to identify 
when the corporation can be equated with being a knowing 
participant in the fraud.302 Once that line is crossed—and the 
corporation is deemed to be a “knowing and substantial 
participant” in the fraud—the corporation would be at equal fault 
such that the in pari delicto defense would be successful against 
it.  
While this suggested approach to measuring corporate fault 
draws from the systems that directors are required to implement, 
the standard to find corporate fault would not necessarily track 
the standard for director liability in this context. For director 
liability, Delaware courts have set a high hurdle for plaintiffs 
seeking to recover from individual directors.303 Only upon an 
“utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and 
reporting system exists” will the necessary condition to liability 
be established.304 Essentially, any system will do to relieve 
directors of liability. To relieve a corporation of a finding of fault 
for failing to detect fraud, however, evidence of more than the 
mere existence of systems may be desirable.  
                                                                                                     
a corporation is involved, the inquiry [into intent] depends in part on corporate 
policies . . . .”); Baker v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 637 N.E.2d 1271, 1277 (Ind. 
1994) (finding no corporate intent because of “the sheer improbability that a 
corporate employer would adopt policies through its regular decision-making 
channels” sanctioning the behavior at issue). 
 301. AIG II, 976 A.2d 872, 883–84 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 302. See id. at 884 (noting that in pari delicto “requires the court to 
determine that each party acted with scienter in the sense that it was a 
knowing and substantial participant in the wrongful scheme”). 
 303. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 
1996) (“Such a test of liability—lack of good faith as evidenced by sustained or 
systematic failure of a director to exercise reasonable oversight—is quite high.”). 
 304. Id. 
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1. Federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines as a Standard 
for Adequate Systems 
For this determination, it may be useful to refer, as 
Chancellor Allen did in his Caremark opinion, to the Federal 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines.305 As part of an effort to 
ensure corporate compliance with external legal requirements, 
the Guidelines set forth a uniform sentencing structure for 
organizations that violate criminal law.306 Its goal is to “provide 
just punishment, adequate deterrence, and incentives for 
organizations to maintain internal mechanisms for preventing, 
detecting, and reporting criminal conduct.”307 In determining an 
organization’s culpability, the Guidelines use as one mitigating 
factor the existence of an effective compliance and ethics 
program.308 Because of this, Chancellor Allen concluded that 
“[a]ny rational person” attempting to meet her responsibility as a 
member of the board of directors must implement such a system 
to take advantage of the reduced sanction in the event the 
organization is convicted of a crime.309 
The Caremark opinion used the Guidelines only to conclude 
that directors must implement such systems to avoid personal 
liability. In the context of examining corporate acts to determine 
if a corporation can meaningfully be considered a wrongdoer, 
however, the Guidelines may provide additional assistance. The 
mitigating factor of whether a corporation has an “effective 
compliance and ethics program” targets acts by a corporation that 
would render it less culpable for the underlying illegality.310 The 
idea of culpability under the Guidelines transfers effectively to 
measure the corporation’s wrongdoing in failing to detect an 
agent’s fraud.311 
                                                                                                     
 305. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (2011) [hereinafter 
GUIDELINES]. 
 306. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969.  
 307. GUIDELINES, supra note 305, intro. commentary. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. 
 310. See GUIDELINES, supra note 305, § 8B2.1 (describing how an 
organization can have an effective compliance and ethics program which would 
reduce its culpability score). 
 311. The author thanks Washington and Lee University School of Law 
Professor Christopher M. Bruner for suggesting the Guidelines as a helpful tool 
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The standard laid out in the Guidelines for an effective 
compliance and ethics program is straightforward. To have an 
effective program, the organization must do two things: First, it 
must exercise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal 
conduct.312  Second, it must promote “an organizational culture 
that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance 
with the law.”313 The Guidelines offer details on how a 
corporation can meet these two requirements.  The corporation 
should establish standards and procedures to detect and prevent 
criminal conduct.  The organization’s governing authority, high-
level personnel, and specific individuals within the organization 
should all have a role to play in implementing these procedures.  
An organization should take steps not to hire individuals known 
to have engaged in illegal activities.  It should have training 
programs in place.  The effectiveness of the program should be 
periodically evaluated.  The program should be promoted with 
appropriate incentives for compliance and appropriate 
disciplinary measures for noncompliance. 
The Guidelines also offer factors to consider when evaluating 
the adequacy of a corporation’s program. It enumerates relevant 
factors: the applicable industry practice or government 
standards, the size of the organization, and whether the 
organization has engaged in similar misconduct in the past. 
Notably, the Guidelines state that the failure to detect the 
instant case of fraud does not necessarily mean that the program 
is ineffective.314 
2. Applying the Guidelines as the Measure of Corporate 
Wrongdoing 
To measure corporate wrongdoing using this guide, a 
threshold question would be, did the board implement adequate 
systems? If the answer is yes, then the directors would not face 
personal liability under Caremark. But the corporation may still 
                                                                                                     
to evaluate a corporation’s acts in an effort to determine at what point a 
corporation can be considered a wrongdoer. 
 312. GUIDELINES, supra note 305, § 8B2.1. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. § 8B2.1(a). 
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be answerable for wrongdoing if officers and employees did not 
use due diligence to implement the systems.   
By judging a corporation based on its corporate systems, 
corporate actors have an incentive to create and implement sound 
systems—an incentive that parallels a director’s incentive to 
implement these systems to avoid personal liability under 
Caremark—that will protect the corporation’s ability to recover 
from outsiders in the event that insiders are engaged in a 
fraudulent scheme. Because no system will detect all fraud, a rule 
that can strip a corporation of its cause of action based on the 
fraudulent act of one agent disincentivizes the corporation from 
pursuing rigorous anti-fraud policies. Measuring corporate 
wrongdoing using corporate systems—for the purpose of 
satisfying an element of the in pari delicto defense—would create 
an incentive to create adequate systems and would result in a 
corporation being judged by acts that can more fairly be 
characterized as those of the corporation as a whole. 
This suggestion speaks directly to the problem courts have 
been circling by using exceptions to apply or not apply imputation 
and in pari delicto.315 For example, when there is no distinction 
between the fault of the corporation and that of the agent—the 
sole-actor exception—imputation is justified and should apply 
regardless of an adverse interest.316 But when the majority of the 
board is honest and one among them is committing fraud—the 
innocent decision-maker exception—imputation seems 
unwarranted and has been discarded.317  
                                                                                                     
 315. See, e.g., In re CBI Holding Co., 311 B.R. 350, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(noting that the innocent insider exception seeks to prevent unfair punishment 
of innocent members of management who would have prevented the misconduct 
of the guilty had they known of it). 
 316. See, e.g., Thabault v. Chait, 541 F.3d 512, 527 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating 
that under the sole actor exception an “agent’s fraudulent conduct will be 
imputed to the principal regardless of whether the agent’s conduct was adverse 
to the principal’s interests”); AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 331 (Pa. 2010) (noting that 
when an “action [is] between a corporation controlled by a single individual and 
a sole-proprietor auditor, there would be a good case to be made that in pari 
delicto should apply to negate all causes of action” because any auditor 
misrepresentation would have “full corporate complicity”). 
 317. See, e.g., Wechsler v. Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent & Sheinfeld, LLP, 212 
B.R. 34, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that absent a finding that “all relevant 
shareholders and/or decision-makers are involved in the fraud,” the fraud 
cannot be imputed to the corporation for purposes of in pari delicto). But see 
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Similarly, the idea of fault drives courts’ uncertainty over 
allowing the defense when the appointment of a receiver or 
bankruptcy trustee “removed the wrongdoer from the scene.”318 
Although this does not present an identical issue, it is another 
instance where courts have struggled with applying in pari 
delicto when the actual party before the court is not a wrongdoer. 
This discomfort is warranted because the policy justifications for 
in pari delicto—denying an admitted wrongdoer access to the 
courts to deter illegality and prevent a waste of judicial 
resources319—are not advanced when the plaintiff has done no 
wrong. Instead, the defendant unjustly uses an equitable doctrine 
to skirt liability. 
C. A Limited Application of In Pari Delicto Adheres to 
Policy Objectives 
Measuring fault based on corporate systems would require a 
fact-intensive inquiry into the corporation’s policies to determine 
if it could fairly be deemed a “knowing and substantial 
participant in the wrongful scheme.”320 This process may be more 
demanding than simply imputing a fraudulent agent’s acts to the 
corporation. On the other hand, with the current inquiries into 
corporate benefit and the agent’s self-interest to determine if the 
adverse interest exception applies, perhaps analyzing a 
corporation’s fault would be less demanding. Notably, this inquiry 
would not encompass the weighing of faults that in pari delicto is 
calculated to avoid.321 In fact, determining if a plaintiff has itself 
                                                                                                     
Rudolph, supra note 36, at 580 (noting that “more courts have rejected, rather 
than accepted, the ‘innocent decision-maker’ doctrine”). 
 318. Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 319. See, e.g., Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 950 (N.Y. 2010) 
(describing the policy justifications which have supported the doctrine for two 
centuries). 
 320. AIG II, 976 A.2d 872, 883–84 (Del. Ch. 2009) (noting that in pari delicto 
“requires the court to determine that each party acted with scienter in the sense 
that it was a knowing and substantial participant in the wrongful scheme”). 
 321. See id. at 894 (applying the in pari delicto defense to bar suit by the 
plaintiff corporation against its non-auditor co-conspirators because “the in pari 
delicto doctrine has long acted as a bar to the[] ponderous inquiries” of who was 
more harmed by the parties’ illegal conduct); id. at 883–84 (“Although the literal 
translation of in pari delicto is ‘in equal fault,’ the doctrine does not require that 
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acted wrongly is necessary to the in pari delicto defense. Every 
defendant who institutes the defense raises this issue for 
determination. Just as human plaintiffs deserve an inquiry into 
their behavior, corporate plaintiffs should be judged by theirs.  
After such a determination, if the corporation is found 
responsible for the fraud and the in pari delicto defense applies, 
the auditor has a complete defense and will not have to answer 
for any wrongdoing. This solution seems identical to the use of in 
pari delicto and imputation to bar the claim and does not seem to 
answer the important underlying question: should auditors as a 
group be insulated from liability for professional malpractice? 
This result is not identical, however, and answers the underlying 
question in the negative while allowing for an exception only 
when the doctrine of in pari delicto so requires.  
Application of the in pari delicto defense only in those cases 
where the plaintiff corporation is meaningfully at fault creates a 
fair and workable result for three reasons. First, this is not a 
blanket rule that immunizes auditors in all cases. The auditor 
will skirt liability in some cases where its performance fell short 
of the professional mark. But this is consistent with the policy 
judgment that in pari delicto represents. Society is comfortable 
not punishing a defendant when his accuser bears equal fault.322 
Second, this outcome is consistent with agency law while 
furthering tort-liability objectives. This approach leaves 
imputation untouched. It recognizes, however, that imputation 
functions differently when raised as part of a defense.323 Limiting 
imputation to its proper function furthers the tort-liability 
objectives of deterring wrongdoing and compensating victims. 
Preventing a corporation from recovering from third-parties when 
its policies are deficient incentivizes those with the ability to 
monitor the corporation—the directors and officers—to create and 
                                                                                                     
a court engage in the type of accounting that in pari delicto is meant to 
avoid . . . .”). 
 322. See, e.g., AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 329 (Pa. 2010) (“[I]n pari delicto serves 
the public interest by relieving courts from lending their offices to mediating 
disputes among wrongdoers, as well as by deterring illegal conduct.”). 
 323. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03(b) (2006) (stating that a 
principal’s claim against an auditor “should not be defeated by imputing to the 
principal its agents’ knowledge of deficiencies in the processes under scrutiny”). 
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implement proper procedures.324 Even shareholders, who are not 
realistically in a position to monitor management,325 can inform 
themselves of such policies and determine if they are sufficient. If 
a shareholder finds corporate policies deficient or questionable, 
the shareholder can move on to a less risky investment. It may be 
unrealistic to expect shareholders of large corporations to 
investigate and monitor corporate fraud-detection systems.326 But 
evaluating corporate fault in a way that could be monitored 
empowers shareholders and diminishes the risk that the fraud of 
one insider could undermine the entire value of their investment. 
By affording shareholders the opportunity to monitor and control 
their investment, application of the in pari delicto defense seems 
less harsh.327  
Third, this approach addresses the concern that auditors will 
necessarily be less culpable than the corporation’s fraudulent 
agents.328 Even if this is so, when the acts of the auditor are 
properly measured against the corporation rather than the agent, 
the balance might shift. If it does not, in pari delicto would 
apply.329 If it does—that is, if the fraudulently prepared financial 
statement was unsanctioned and undetected by a corporation 
                                                                                                     
 324. Cf. NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 887 (N.J. 2006) 
(finding that, to deter future wrongdoing, courts should “not indiscriminately 
provide a safe haven for [auditors’] allegedly negligent conduct”).  
 325. See, e.g., id. at 886 (noting that “the nature of today’s corporation 
makes it increasingly unlikely that shareholders of large corporations have the 
ability to effectively monitor the actions of corporate officials”). 
 326. But see id. at 885 (noting that “shareholders with a substantial 
ownership of stock may have the ability to affect board elections” which gives 
them some measure of control and access to information). 
 327. Cf. id. (“Allowing the impropriety of some shareholders—who, as 
directors and officers, perpetrated or did not prevent the fraud—to bar all 
shareholders from recovery is unfair and improper.”). 
 328. See, e.g., id. at 904 (Rivera-Soto, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
“auditor’s role in the accurate presentation of a client’s financial statement is 
limited, and most importantly, secondary to that of the client”).  
 329. But see AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 828 n.246 (Del. Ch. 2009) (suggesting that 
in pari delicto should never be an available defense against an auditor because 
of an auditor’s distinct role); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b 
(2006) (taking the position that a “principal’s claim against the service provider 
[retained to assess the accuracy of its financial reporting] should not be defeated 
by imputing to the principal its agents’ knowledge of deficiencies in the 
processes under scrutiny”). 
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with sound systems—the auditor will be responsible to the 
corporation for its negligent work.  
Another concern, expressed by the New York Court of 
Appeals, is that a double standard is created when you hold the 
auditor responsible for its agent’s acts and you do not hold the 
corporation responsible for its agent’s acts.330 This posture, 
however, is consistent with agency law and is especially 
warranted against auditors because their work has effects beyond 
their relationship with the corporation. This is consistent with 
agency law because, as discussed at the beginning of this Part, 
imputation functions properly when a principal defends against a 
claim based on its agent’s wrongdoing.331 A corporation acting as 
a plaintiff acts as a distinct entity and imputation should not be 
the only relevant factor in determining whether the plaintiff may 
pursue a claim against its auditor for professional malpractice.332 
This approach should not require the auditor defendant to face 
uncapped liability for the losses arising from the corporate fraud. 
Rather, the auditor should be liable for damages proximately 
caused by its negligent performance under the scope of its 
engagement with the corporation.333 
                                                                                                     
 330. See Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 958 (N.Y. 2010) (finding 
that to allow suit by creditors and shareholders merely because they are 
innocent parties would “creat[e] a double standard whereby the innocent 
stakeholders of the corporation’s outside professionals are held responsible for 
the sins of their errant agents while the innocent stakeholders of the 
corporation itself are not”). 
 331. See id. at 953 (“[P]rincipals, rather than third parties, are best-suited to 
police their chosen agents . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 cmt. c 
(2006) (“It is helpful to view questions about imputation from the perspective of 
risk assumption, taking into account the posture of the third party whose legal 
relations with the principal are at issue.”); cf. Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934 § 21D, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f) (2006) (requiring proportionate liability in 
private securities litigation). 
 332. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (2006) (“Knowledge, 
including imputed knowledge, is not always determinative of, and sometimes is 
not even relevant to, certain claims and defenses.”). 
 333. See AIG I, 965 A.2d at 828 n. 246 (suggesting “a more thoughtful tact” 
to auditor liability such as “the use of heightened pleading standards, standards 
of liability (e.g. gross negligence), proof (e.g. clear and convincing evidence), and 
measures designed to address liability” such as capping liability at some 
multiple of audit fees); NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 889 (N.J. 
2006) (finding that the auditor should be judged based on whether it “was 
negligent in performing its agreed duties and to what extent such negligence 
proximately contributed to the damages suffered by plaintiff”). 
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Holding an auditor accountable for its work is also desirable 
because an auditor’s role is unique and has implications beyond 
its performance under the contract with the corporation. Auditors 
“have duties not just to management, but to the public at 
large.”334 Auditors are hired in part because of the potential that 
corporate officers will “misuse their powers and commit acts of 
financial wrongdoing.”335 To limit auditors’ accountability for 
their performance as it relates to the very thing they were hired 
to help monitor eliminates a large incentive to do a good job. At 
the outset of an engagement, an auditor would know that the 
likelihood of ever being held accountable for its work under the 
agreement is minimal. In the only situation where its work is 
likely to be scrutinized—the discovery of the corporation’s fraud—
it is immune from suit.  
Further, if during the engagement the auditor suspects or 
discovers fraud, it has two choices: (1) reveal the fraud or 
investigate further, and risk harming its relationship with the 
corporate officers whom it has just accused of fraud; or (2) ignore 
the warning signals and continue the relationship. Knowing 
auditors will face this choice, the law should take a firm position 
that an auditor must choose to investigate and reveal fraud. The 
threat of liability will incentivize the auditor to maintain sound 
policies to monitor its individual agents, and individual agents 
will be aware that the auditor may seek indemnification from 
them upon a judgment against the auditor. 
V. Conclusion 
The in pari delicto defense is only available when a plaintiff 
bears equal fault for the illegality at issue. Imputing a corporate 
plaintiff with an agent’s fraud is an inadequate measure of fault 
for this purpose. Imputation functions properly to allow third 
parties to rely on their dealings with a principal’s agent.336 It is 
                                                                                                     
 334. AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 828 n.246 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 335. Id.; see also AIG II, 976 A.2d 872, 890 n.49 (Del. Ch. 2009) (finding that 
policy justifies claims against auditors for malpractice because they are 
“employed by a corporation’s outside directors to help them ensure the lawful 
operation of the corporation”). 
 336. See DeMott, supra note 11, at 291 (noting that imputation functions to 
“determin[e] a principal’s legal rights and obligations as between the principal 
338 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 275 (2012) 
not proper for the task of assigning fault to a corporation when 
the corporation, as a plaintiff, seeks to recover from a third party 
who harmed it. In this case, the corporation’s blameworthiness 
deserves a more holistic assessment.  
Evaluating the corporation’s information gathering and 
reporting systems for this purpose would provide a measure of 
the corporation which (1) better captures the acts of the 
corporation as a whole, (2) allows the corporation to retain its 
ability to sue its auditor for malpractice by implementing 
adequate systems, (3) incentivizes corporations to pursue 
rigorous anti-fraud systems, and (4) relieves auditors of liability 
for malpractice only when the policy justifications for in pari 
delicto are present. The historical approach to in pari delicto in 
corporate auditor malpractice cases has proven inadequate. A 
new approach is available and overdue. 
                                                                                                     
and third parties with whom the agent deals on the principal’s behalf”). 
